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THE POLITICAL REMEDIES DOCTRINE
David M. Driesen*
ABSTRACT
This Article describes and analyzes a hitherto unrecognized doctrine—the
political remedies doctrine. That doctrine maintains that courts ought not
adjudicate separation of powers claims until both political branches of
government have asserted their rights. The doctrine has escaped analysis (and
even explicit notice) because judges camouflage it, employing it while invoking
the more familiar rubrics of ripeness, standing, political question, and equitable
discretion. Justice Powell provided the leading articulation of the doctrine, but
the Supreme Court as a whole has never squarely endorsed it. The political
remedies doctrine, however, has played a surprisingly important role in the
lower courts, helping justify refusal to adjudicate war powers claims and cases
arising from President Trump’s challenges to the constitutional order.
While invoked as a neutral rule, the courts always apply the doctrine to
shield presidential acts from judicial scrutiny and never to protect acts of
Congress from judicial interference. Accordingly, it aids aggrandizement of
presidential power. Partly for that reason, this doctrine has great potential to
unravel the rule of law and even, during times of partisan stress, to hasten the
collapse of the separation of powers undergirding our democracy.
This Article claims that the courts should not apply this doctrine, except
perhaps to avoid adjudication of challenges to bipartisan legislation signed by
the President. It employs a Coasean property rights analysis to provide new
insights germane not just to this doctrine, but also to debates about the proper
role of bargaining in resolving separation of powers questions, the relationship
between law and politics, and how the courts should approach justiciability
doctrine more generally. That Coasean analysis shows that judicial resolution
of a separation of powers claim on the merits does not preclude political
bargaining, but simply determines a baseline for future negotiations.
Conversely, dismissing a claim because of the potential for political bargaining
functions much like a ruling on the merits, also creating a constitutional baseline
for future political negotiations. Hence, the justiciability issues involved when
political remedies are invoked do not present a choice between political and
judicial resolution of disputes, but rather a choice about baseline power
*
University Professor, Syracuse University. I thank Aziz Huq and Jonathan Nash for very helpful
comments. Any errors are my own.
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allocations form which to conduct future bargaining. Thus, analysis of this
hitherto unrecognized doctrine yields valuable insights.
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INTRODUCTION
The federal courts sometimes decline to review constitutional questions on
the grounds that they should not adjudicate separations of powers cases until
both of the political branches of the government have asserted their rights. One
might call this the “political remedies doctrine” because the doctrine maintains
that courts should refuse judicial review when a political remedy is available.
Justice Powell articulated the political remedies doctrine in Goldwater v.
Carter to justify not deciding whether a President may unilaterally terminate a
treaty enacted with the advice and consent of the Senate.1 The Goldwater Court
agreed that the case was not justiciable by a 5-4 margin in a summary ruling
without a single majority opinion.2 The doctrine has aided the transfer of the war
power from Congress, the body possessing the power according to the
constitutional text, to the President.3 It has also played a major role in catalyzing
a cutback in the scope of congressional standing to sue.4 More recently, it figured
in a series of lower court decisions dismissing challenges to President Trump’s
invocation of emergency powers to build a wall on the U.S. southern border
without a congressional appropriation, defiance of congressional subpoenas, and
alleged violations of the Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses.5
In spite of the political remedies doctrine’s influence, the literature has not
noticed this doctrine’s existence, let alone analyzed its implications in a
sustained way. The doctrine has escaped notice because judges camouflage it,
blending it in with the justiciability doctrines that surround it—the doctrines of
ripeness, standing, political questions, and equitable discretion. Furthermore,
while it has played a prominent role in justifying some opinions in the lower
courts, the Supreme Court has never endorsed it. Only Justice Powell’s
1
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the courts should
not adjudicate “a dispute between Congress and the President . . . unless and until each branch has taken action
asserting its constitutional authority”).
2
See id. at 996, 1002–05 (plurality opinion).
3
See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 1020
(2008) (noting that the judiciary’s ducking of War Powers Resolution cases has “allow[ed] the President to
ignore it”); see also Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 755 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1985) (per
curiam) (invoking the political remedies doctrine briefly to justify rejecting a complaint about the legality of
presidential deployment of cruise missiles).
4
See David J. Wiener, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205, 218 (2001) (citing
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997)) (commenting that notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist’s disclaiming
reliance on the political remedies doctrine in Raines v. Byrd, some lower courts have read Raines as demanding
its application in cases of congressional standing); see, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (denying congressmen standing to enforce the War Powers Resolution because they have not used political
remedies).
5
See infra notes 135–98 and accompanying text.
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concurring opinion in Goldwater squarely relies on the political remedies
doctrine. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the other four Justices in Goldwater
invokes the political remedies doctrine, but the doctrine did not play as central a
role in his reasoning as it does in Powell’s.6
The political remedies doctrine, however, merits sustained attention on its
own, not only because of its influence on the lower federal courts in extremely
important cases, but also for its potential future influence. While framed as a
neutral rule of restraint applying equally to review of both political branches’
decisions, in practice, it consistently augments presidential power at the expense
of Congress. Moreover, it has the potential to broadly liberate the President from
obligations to comply with applicable law. Indeed, Justice Scalia in a dissent
advocated an interpretation of the doctrine that would allow a President to nullify
numerous statutes by simply declaring them unconstitutional.7 Justices still on
the Court signed on to the Scalia dissent8 and a lower court has followed it in
declining to protect congressional spending power from presidential usurpation.9
The political remedies doctrine also merits attention for theoretical reasons.
The political remedies doctrine provides an opportunity to engage in broader
questions about separation of powers. Since this doctrine, as applied, liberates
presidential actions, but not acts of Congress, from judicial review, it invites
questions about this asymmetry’s effects and desirability.
The analysis of the doctrine offered here contributes to the theory of
negotiated separation of powers arrangements, as scholars have debated whether
the Supreme Court should defer to power allocations negotiated between the
legislative and executive branches.10 It shows, contrary to the assumptions
undergirding that literature, that neither political remedies dismissals nor
adjudication of separation of powers claims on the merits precludes subsequent
political bargaining. Both adjudication and dismissal establish baselines for
future negotiations.
6
See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (finding a political question when asked
to decide a separation of powers claim when each branch “has resources available to protect and assert its
interests”).
7
See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 786–87 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
President should decline to enforce statutes that he finds unconstitutional and that a judge should enter a consent
decree forbidding statutory enforcement when the President enforces it but says it is unconstitutional).
8
Id. at 778.
9
See House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 16 (2019) (citing Windsor, 570 U.S. at
790) (declining to adjudicate the House of Representative’s claim that the President usurped the House’s
appropriations power by building a wall unauthorized by statute).
10
E.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution: Navigating the Separation of
Powers Both Horizontally and Vertically, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 4, 20–23 (2015) (reviewing the debate).
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The doctrine also raises questions about the relationship between law and
politics. The political remedies doctrine and some commentators suggest that
law and politics exist as separate spheres.11 But this Article questions the notion
that judicial rulings end politics and that politics substitute for judicial decisions
when courts dismiss cases.
The analysis developed here on all of these questions has implications for
justiciability doctrines more broadly. Both the Supreme Court and
commentators have noted that the justiciability doctrines overlap.12 A
consideration motivating the political remedies doctrine—that judicial review
might improperly displace political decision-making—plays a role in shaping all
the justiciability doctrines.13
While I write on a blank slate about this particular doctrine, several
literatures do address the role of political remedies in adjudication, at least in
passing. I therefore draw upon articles addressing the idea as part of the doctrine
of congressional standing,14 discussions of the role of politically negotiated
resolution of separation of powers disputes,15 and general theoretical works on
the role of law and politics in restraining presidents.16
Michael Sant’Ambrogio’s article, Legislative Exhaustion, comes closest to
this Article’s topic by focusing on the idea of using the availability of political
11

See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 992–93.
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)
(noting the Court’s “repeated” characterization of mootness as “standing set in a timeframe”); Matthew I. Hall,
Making Sense of Legislative Standing, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2016) (describing the legislative standing doctrine
as overlapping with “related” doctrines, especially the political question doctrine); Note, Standing to Sue for
Members of Congress, 83 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666–69 (1974) (describing a discrete standing doctrine as a recent
development with antecedents in cases relying on a mixture of “other jurisdictional inquiries”).
13
See, e.g., Gladstone v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (stating the standing doctrine confines
the judiciary to its “properly limited . . . role . . . in a democratic society” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975))); Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (identifying “avoidance of premature
adjudication” and “judicial interference” with agency decision-making as part of the “basic rationale” for the
ripeness doctrine); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803) (stating that the courts should
not resolve political questions because the President must have the freedom to exercise his “discretion” on some
matters).
14
See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, Judicial Review, Foreign Affairs, and Legislative Standing, 25 GA. L.
REV. 227 (1991); Tara Leigh Grove, Government Standing and the Fallacy of Constitutional Injury, 167 U. PA.
L. REV. 611 (2019); Hall, supra note 12 (developing a model to clarify uncertainty in congressional standing
jurisprudence); Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV. 339
(2015).
15
See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014);
Posner & Vermeulle, supra note 3; Note, supra note 12; Jonathan Wagner, The Justiciability of CongressionalPlaintiff Suits, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1982).
16
See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN
REPUBLIC (2010).
12
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remedies to decide questions of congressional standing in suits seeking to
compel the executive branch to properly execute federal statutes.17 By contrast,
the political remedies doctrine goes beyond congressional standing doctrine and
properly focuses on separation of powers cases, not on cases seeking proper
enforcement of statutes. My analysis, however, does illuminate congressional
standing to enforce statutes and casts doubt on Sant’Ambrogio’s claim that a
legislative exhaustion requirement forces deliberation over policy.18
This Article’s first Part tells the story of the political remedies doctrine’s
articulation in the Supreme Court and use in the lower courts. It begins with an
account of the doctrine’s articulation in Goldwater and its subsequent reception
in the Supreme Court. This account reveals that the doctrine has influenced
subsequent decisions, but that the Supreme Court has not squarely endorsed it.
This Part continues with an account of the doctrine’s influence in the lower
courts, looking at its effect on war power cases and recent decisions adjudicating
President Trump’s challenges to the constitutional order. The analysis reveals
that the doctrine, while originally arising in the realm of foreign affairs, now
influences the domestic constitutional order in important ways.
The second Part analyzes the doctrine’s potential to unravel the rule of law.
It shows that the political remedies doctrine, while articulated as a protection for
both political branches, shields only ultra vires presidential action from judicial
check. The doctrine, in practice, never protects acts of Congress from judicial
interference. This Part explores the breadth of its potential to unravel the rule of
law by analyzing Justice Scalia’s dissent in United States v. Windsor, which used
the doctrine to justify empowering presidents to abrogate statutes.19
The third Part critiques the doctrine. It argues that the strongest case for
avoiding judicial review in favor of political resolution of disputes arises not
from the possibility of a political remedy to an open dispute between the political
branches of government but from completed bipartisan agreements between the
President and Congress about how to share powers. It uses a Coasean property
rights framework to demonstrate two propositions. First, a dismissal under the
political remedies doctrine establishes a power allocation, just like an explicit
ruling on the merits. Second, an explicit ruling on the merits does not preclude
17
Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1253, 1259 (2017)
(advocating denying Congress “access to federal courts” when “Congress does not like the Executive’s use of
enforcement discretion or its interpretation of the law” to encourage “legislative . . . refine[ment of] statutory
regimes”).
18
See id. at 1258 (finding that the goal of forcing deliberation suggests denying Congress access to courts
to enforce statutes).
19
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 778–91 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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political bargaining.20 Accordingly, the political remedies doctrine does not
protect opportunities for political settlement of controversies. Instead, both the
political remedies doctrine and explicit merits rulings establish baseline power
allocations, which influence the results of bargaining.
This Part shows, moreover, that the political remedies doctrine is
inconsistent with existing Supreme Court precedent. The political remedies
doctrine’s welcoming of politically negotiated reallocation of power conflicts
with the formalist notion that the Constitution provides reliable answers to
separation of powers questions, which courts must recognize, and that particular
arrangements are necessary to preserve liberty.
The best defense of the political remedies doctrine stems, this Part claims,
from the need to avoid judicial articulation of unwise legal doctrine. Many
scholars have suggested that this danger proves acute in separation of powers
cases.21 The Court could better effectuate that goal by giving more weight to the
presumption of constitutionality in separation of powers cases and through the
use of less problematic justiciability doctrines. The political remedies doctrine,
this Part argues, relies on an outmoded Madisonian political economy model
that tends to disable judicial intervention precisely when it is most needed, when
partisan polarization provides opportunities to dismantle checks and balances.22
This Article closes with some tentative observations about the links between
this analysis of the political remedies doctrine and other justiciability doctrines,
which also rely, to some degree, on a preference for political resolution of
disputes. It suggests that the courts probably should apply justiciability restraints
more strictly to challenges to interbranch bipartisan consensus than to efforts to
resolve interbranch disputes.

20
Accord David Landau, Political Support and Structural Constitutional Law, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1069,
1075–79 (2016) (discussing how the political branches may “work[] around” structural constitutional rulings).
21
See infra notes 311–14.
22
See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 115–17 (2018); cf. Daryl J.
Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2368 (2006)
(claiming judicial review is most needed during “eras of strongly unified government”). See generally Neal
Devins, Congress, the Courts, and Party Polarization: Why Congress Rarely Checks the President and Why the
Courts Should Not Take Congress’ Place, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 55, 55 (2018) (describing the point that “Congress
is generally uninterested in . . . asserting its institutional prerogatives” under the Constitution as “clearly right”);
Lucas Issacharoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutional Implications of the Cost of War, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 169,
176 (2016) (characterizing the rise of political polarization as “perhaps the most significant, and almost certainly
the most examined, institutional shift in American constitutional life”); Levinson & Pildes, supra, at 2313
(stating that competition between political parties has displaced competition between branches of government).
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THE STORY OF THE POLITICAL REMEDIES DOCTRINE

Our story begins with an account of the political remedies doctrine’s
articulation in Goldwater v. Carter23 and its treatment in subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, which reveals that the doctrine lacks a clear endorsement in
majority decisions. The story continues with a discussion of its more frequent
use in the lower courts, first in war powers cases and more recently in cases
challenging the domestic constitutional order.
A. The Political Remedies Doctrine in the Supreme Court
1. Justice Powell’s Goldwater Opinion
Goldwater v. Carter arose out of President Carter’s effort to normalize
relations with Communist China.24 To facilitate that normalization, President
Carter decided to terminate a longstanding mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.25
Senator Barry Goldwater and several other congressmen challenged the treaty
termination, claiming that the President may not abrogate a treaty without the
Senate’s consent.26 The District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded
that the justiciability doctrines did not bar the court from reaching the merits and
unanimously found that the case posed a legal question, rather than a political
one.27
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the case nonjusticiable in a 5-4
summary disposition.28 Following this decision, the President has almost always
terminated treaties unilaterally.29
Justice Powell most clearly articulated the political remedies doctrine. His
concurring opinion declares that “a dispute between Congress and the President
is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action
asserting its constitutional authority.”30 While Powell did not specify what sort
of action he had in mind, presumably legislation repudiating the withdrawal
from the treaty or a funding cutoff designed to change the withdrawal decision

23

444 U.S. 996 (1979).
See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 700–01 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev’d, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
25
See id.
26
See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring).
27
Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 698 n.1.
28
See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996, 1002–06 (Powell, J. & Rehnquist, J., concurring).
29
Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential Power to Terminate International Agreements, 128 YALE L.J. F. 432,
437 (2018).
30
See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J. concurring).
24
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would count. Powell’s opinion suggests that the political remedies doctrine is
prudential, not a hard and fast rule limiting the courts’ jurisdiction under Article
III.31
Powell’s articulation of the political remedies doctrine also establishes a
limit on its application. It does not preclude judicial review when the political
branches reach a “constitutional impasse.”32
Powell said little to justify the doctrine. He did state, however, that
differences between Congress and the President usually “turn on political rather
than legal considerations” and should do so.33 This Article will refer to the idea
that politics rather than law should resolve separation of powers issues as the
“politics preference.” Powell also articulated a concern that adjudicating “issues
affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress” before
they reach a “constitutional impasse” encourages “small groups or even
individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues before the
normal political process has the opportunity to resolve the conflict.”34 Thus,
Powell apparently assumed that judicial resolution of the merits of separation of
powers claims would interfere with political resolution of conflicts.
Constitutional law courses usually treat Goldwater, including its political
remedies doctrine, as an exemplar of judicial reluctance to adjudicate foreign
affairs cases.35 But the doctrine, as articulated by Powell, seems to reach all
conflicts between the President and Congress, whether foreign or domestic.
2. Justice Rehnquist’s Goldwater Opinion
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the remaining four justices denying
justiciability also made use of Powell’s logic. Justice Rehnquist dubbed the
treaty termination question a nonjusticiable “political question” because it
involved the President’s foreign affairs power and the extent to which Congress
may negate the President’s action.36 The notion that questions about the scope
31
See id. (stating that “[p]rudential considerations persuade me” that judicial review should only occur
after both branches assert their authority) (emphasis added).
32
See id. (“The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the
President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.”).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 111–14, 339 (6th ed. 2020) (treating
Goldwater as an exemplar of the tendency to treat foreign affairs issues as political questions but including the
Powell concurrence).
36
Goldwater, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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of the President’s foreign affairs power necessarily constitute political questions,
however, seems inconsistent with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
which resolved a legal challenge to President Truman’s seizure of steel mills in
support of the war effort in Korea on the merits.37 Justice Rehnquist
distinguished Youngstown by stating that Senator Goldwater’s challenge
required the Court to “settle a dispute between co-equal branches of government,
each of which has resources available to protect and assert its own interests”—
a clear reference to political remedies.38 Since the Court settles disputes between
co-equal branches of government every time it resolves a separation of powers
case and did so in Youngstown, the existence of a separation of powers dispute
alone cannot possibly serve as a justification for dismissal. Accordingly,
Rehnquist’s statement is best read as indicating that the availability of potential
political remedies helped justify Rehnquist’s denial of justiciability as well.39
Thus, the political remedies doctrine played a role in the Court’s decision to
refuse review of treaty termination in Goldwater. Justice Powell clearly
endorsed it and the rest of the majority favoring dismissal also suggested that it
aids justification of Goldwater’s result.
3. Relationship to Other Justiciability Doctrines
Justice Powell camouflaged his creation of the political remedies doctrine
by identifying it with the ripeness doctrine.40 He characterized the treaty
termination issue as unripe until Congress votes against treaty termination.41

37

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
39
Justice Rehnquist’s statement might be read to suggest that Senator Goldwater’s presence as a plaintiff
made the treaty termination question into a political question. But that idea is plainly at odds with Flast v. Cohen,
which explains that the question of whether the issue posed in a case is political or legal is wholly distinct from
the question of what party may bring the case (the question of standing). See Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83, 100
(1968); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204–18 (1962) (characterizing standing as focusing on the party
bringing suit while defining the political question doctrine as focusing on the issue to be adjudicated); Comm.
on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (distinguishing the standing doctrine’s
focus on proper parties from the political remedies doctrine’s focus on the existence of a separation of powers
dispute).
40
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). See generally Gene R. Nichol, Ripeness and the
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 156 (1987) (examining the ripeness doctrine and concluding that it is more
intertwined with the merits than with Article III). I identify Powell with the doctrine’s creation because his
articulation of it had a big influence on the lower courts, not because his opinion lacks antecedents.
41
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring) (mentioning that the Court should not decide
“unripe” issues and then stating that “a dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial
review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority”).
38
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This idea of making the congressional stance relevant to justiciability does
not fit traditional ripeness doctrine.42 Ripeness constitutes a prudential doctrine
primarily designed to avoid premature adjudication of issues that might become
more clearly defined later on.43 In assessing whether the courts might benefit
from waiting without impairing litigants’ legitimate interests in prompt
resolution of disputes, the courts assess the “hardship to the parties” from
postponing review and the “fitness of the issue[]” for prompt judicial review.44
Justice Powell’s concurrence does not articulate a relationship between his
rationale and the doctrine’s fundamentals, but one might understand his opinion
as suggesting that the lack of congressional action fighting the treaty termination
defeats the issue’s fitness for judicial review. The idea that a lack of
congressional action makes a well-defined issue unfit for judicial review,
however, proves tautological and disconnected from the ripeness doctrine’s
purpose.45 The ripeness doctrine’s fitness-for-judicial-review prong focuses on
whether the court’s resolution of the issue before it would benefit from
information gleaned from awaiting application of the law or instead whether the
plaintiff seeks to litigate a “purely legal issue” that does not gain clarity from
further factual development.46 Separation of powers cases raise purely legal
issues, which usually gain little or no clarification from concrete context, as I
have shown elsewhere.47 Because of that, congressional action rarely clarifies
issues and waiting for Congress to act rarely serves the goal of ensuring concrete
adjudication.
None of the Goldwater opinions indicate that later adjudication would
clarify the treaty termination issue. In particular, none of the Justices claimed
42
See Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve as Counterweight, 54 U.
PITT. L. REV. 63, 93 (1992) (referring to the political remedies doctrine as a “special branch of the ripeness
doctrine”); Wagner, supra note 15, at 539 (“Justice Powell’s reliance on ripeness doctrine . . . disregards prior
law.”). But see Blumoff, supra note 14, at 334–37 (suggesting that Powell’s ripeness reasoning fits the doctrine’s
purposes as described by Gene Nichol).
43
See Wagner, supra note 15, at 539 (noting that “[r]ipeness dictates dismissal when the lawsuit lacks a
clearly defined dispute”).
44
See Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998) (quoting Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967)).
45
It proves tautological because the political remedies doctrine itself provides the only justification for
considering an issue not joined by Congress unfit for judicial review.
46
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001) (recognizing that a purely legal issue
“would not ‘benefit from further factual development’” (quoting Ohio Forestry Ass’n, 523 U.S. at 733)); Thomas
v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co, 473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985) (noting that “further factual development” will not
clarify a “purely legal” issue); Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190,
201 (1983) (finding the preemption question fit for judicial resolution because it is “predominantly legal”).
47
David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist
Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808 (2004) (analyzing the abstract reasoning in the Line Item Veto case in
detail and explaining how that style of reasoning applies to other separation of powers cases).
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that a congressional vote against treaty termination would clarify that
constitutional issue. The treaty termination claim relied on a straightforward
textual inference—that the Senate’s role in consenting to a treaty’s creation
implies a role in deciding whether to terminate it.48 Justice Brennan indicated
that he would imply a presidential right to terminate the treaty with Taiwan
unilaterally based on presidential authority to recognize the government of
Communist China.49 So, the resolution of the merits issue required abstract
reasoning about textual inference and the scope of presidential recognition
authority based on past custom and precedent.
The Supreme Court has sometimes said that the ripeness doctrine avoids
“unnecessary decision of constitutional issues.”50 But this avoidance rationale
begs the question of when is a constitutional decision necessary. The Court does
not invoke this principle to avoid ruling on constitutional issues having real
world consequences.51 Instead, it invokes this principle to justify not
adjudicating a challenge to a statute that has never been enforced and therefore
is extremely unlikely to injure anybody.52 Hence, Powell’s opinion is best
understood as articulating a distinct political remedies doctrine that has little to
do with traditional ripeness concerns.
Most of the lower courts treated Goldwater primarily as a case signaling an
extreme hands-off approach to foreign affairs, at least at first.53 Certainly, Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion seems to put foreign affairs cases in a special justiciability
category. Even though he claimed that the question of treaty termination
constitutes a political question, that conclusion required an extremely unusual
approach to the doctrine.54 Federal courts usually find a political question when
a case involves a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for
resolving the question before the Court.55 The Supreme Court relied on this
48

See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50
See Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps. (Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases), 419 U.S. 102, 138
(1974) (dictum).
51
See Nichol, supra note 40, at 171 (noting that the courts have used ripeness “to deny jurisdiction” when
the plaintiffs have not suffered an injury).
52
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (declining to assess the constitutionality of a state ban on
contraception that the state had never enforced).
53
See Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 14
(2017) (suggesting that the breadth of Rehnquist’s Goldwater opinion explains the lower courts’ extensive
reliance on the political question doctrine to refuse to adjudicate foreign affairs cases).
54
See id. at 12–13 (noting Rehnquist’s failure to cite the Baker factors); Blumoff, supra note 14, at 323–
25, 336 (explaining why Rehnquist’s opinion is “woefully underanalyzed” and “does not fit into standard
political question evaluation”).
55
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
49
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factor in 2019 in holding that questions about the fairness of political
gerrymandering constitute political questions, and it also helps explain the one
case Justice Rehnquist relied upon, Coleman v. Miller.56 Nobody claimed that
the issue of treaty termination poses a manageable standards problem, which
may explain why the entire D.C. Circuit unanimously rejected President Carter’s
political question defense.57 The two other Supreme Court cases that somewhat
recently found political questions found “a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”58 In one of these
cases, the Court held that questions about the procedures Congress uses to
handle impeachments constitute political questions because the Constitution
commits impeachment to Congress.59 In the other case, it held that the
Constitution assigns regulation of the National Guard to Congress and the
President.60 Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, however, does not claim that the
Constitution assigns the decision about who has a right to terminate a treaty to
another branch of government.61
Baker v. Carr, traditionally considered the leading case on the political
question doctrine, lists other factors beyond constitutional commitment to other
branches of government and a lack of judicially manageable standards that can
justify finding a political question.62 But Justice Rehnquist did not rely on any
of those factors and none of them suggest that the possibility of a political
remedy converts a legal question into a political one.

56
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2505 (2019); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–04
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)); Coleman, 307 U.S. at 452–
54 (finding no standards that the Court could use to determine the time necessary for a proposed constitutional
amendment to have lapsed); Note, Standing to Sue, supra note 12, at 1679 (reading Coleman as implying “that
legislators may be granted standing in a . . . wide variety of circumstances”).
57
Accord Koh, supra note 29, at 445 (finding no lack of judicially manageable standards on the treaty
termination issue).
58
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
59
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993).
60
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5–12 (1973).
61
Cf. Koh, supra note 29, at 445 (stating that the Constitution does not “textually commit” the treaty
termination question to another branch of government).
62
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. The Baker Court mentioned the following additional factors:

[T]he impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. But see Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195–96 (2012) (describing the political question doctrine
narrowly as only involving the textually demonstrable commitment of an issue to another branch of government
or a problem of judicially manageable standards).
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Almost two decades after Goldwater, the Supreme Court developed a variant
of the political remedies doctrine in Raines v. Byrd.63 In so doing, the Court gave
the doctrine vitality outside the Goldwater realm of foreign affairs.64
Raines arose from a congressional decision to address budget deficits by
giving the President a line item veto—the ability to veto particular spending
authorizations without vetoing an entire budget (which would shut down the
Various
congressmen
challenged
the
statute’s
government).65
constitutionality.66 The Raines Court suggested that only a House of Congress,
not a collection of congressmen, would have standing to challenge actions
enhancing presidential power at the expense of Congress, a stance in some
tension with Coleman v. Miller.67 This increasingly restrictive congressional
standing doctrine has the same tendency as the Goldwater decision of
demanding an institutional stance against the President before the Court will
hear a case.68
We cannot be certain that the Court will follow Raines’s suggestion that a
single House of Congress has standing to vindicate a statute. In 2019, the Court
held that a single house of a state legislature lacks standing to challenge a court
ruling invalidating the legislature’s redistricting plan.69 But the Court’s
increasingly restrictive congressional standing doctrine does not prevent private
litigants from obtaining judicial review. Indeed, the Supreme Court did address
the line item veto’s constitutionality in a subsequent decision at the behest of
private litigants.70
The Supreme Court recently declined to consider the political remedies
doctrine even though the dissent raised it. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton,71 the Court
addressed a justiciability issue of how to resolve a clash between presidential
63

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
See Wiener, supra note 4, at 218 (notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist’s disclaiming reliance on the
political remedies doctrine in Raines, a “close reading of the opinion suggests otherwise”). See generally Hall,
supra note 12, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (claiming that “legislative standing is fundamentally about
when . . . federal courts should” referee “disputes between Congress and the executive branch”).
65
See Driesen, supra note 47, at 809–10.
66
Raines, 521 U.S. at 814.
67
See id. at 831 (Souter, J., concurring).
68
Cf. id. at 829–30 (explaining that the rejection of standing to contest the line item veto does not deprive
the congressmen of a remedy since Congress “may repeal the Act or exempt appropriations bills from its reach”
and suggesting the result might be different if this were not so). For a catalogue of the political remedies available
to Congress, see Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (2012).
69
Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 (2019).
70
See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 425–27, 448–49 (1998) (identifying the private parties
and striking down the line item veto).
71
566 U.S. 189 (2012).
64
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and congressional control over foreign affairs like that posed in Goldwater.72
Congress passed a statute authorizing American citizens born in Jerusalem to
get a passport listing Israel as their birthplace.73 Zivotofsky sought to avail
himself of this statutory right but the State Department refused to list Israel on
his passport, as doing so might undercut the longstanding executive branch
policy of not recognizing Jerusalem as part of Israel.74 Zivotofsky thus presented
a conflict between the President’s implied authority over recognition of foreign
governments and congressional authority over foreign commerce and
immigration.75 Yet, the Court found the case justiciable.76
Justice Breyer invoked the political remedies doctrine in his dissent. He
argued, relying on Justice Rehnquist’s Goldwater opinion, that the existence of
“nonjudicial methods for working out” political differences between the
President and Congress made the passport issue a political question.77 Breyer
read the Rehnquist opinion as treating the political remedies doctrine as a “strong
reason” for the result reached in Goldwater.78
While one might read Zivotofsky as silently repudiating the political
remedies doctrine, it may instead signal a pro-presidential limit on the doctrine’s
use. The Zivotofsky Court justified its decision to treat this separation of powers
question as a justiciable legal issue by stating that the courts have the
responsibility to determine the constitutionality of statutes.79 And indeed, in a
subsequent opinion, the Court struck down the statute as an infringement of the
President’s recognition authority in a 5-4 decision.80 Its first Zivotofsky opinion
leaves open the possibility of continuing to use the political remedies doctrine
to shield the President’s actions from judicial scrutiny, while not applying the
doctrine to shield statutes from judicial review.

72

Id. at 191–93.
Id. at 191.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 197–202; see Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 9, 64 (2015) (describing the merits of the claims
dismissed in Zivitofsky v. Clinton) (majority and dissenting opinions).
76
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. at 201.
77
Id. at 219 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)) (supporting an argument that Zivotofsky’s claims
should be dismissed by noting that the “political branches of Government . . . have nonjudicial methods of
working out their differences”).
78
Id. (characterizing Rehnquist’s opinion as finding a fact similar to the existence of “nonjudicial
methods of working out . . . differences” as a “strong reason for the Judiciary not to decide treaty power
question[s]”).
79
Id. at 196–97.
80
See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. at 32.
73
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Justice Roberts, who wrote the majority opinion in Zivotofsky v. Clinton,
may not have responded to Breyer’s invocation of the political remedies doctrine
because it seemed like a very weak argument when the issue before the Court
was fully joined. Both the President and Congress had taken actions to advance
their rights. Congress used its legislative power to pass a statute authorizing
citizens living in Jerusalem to list Israel as the place of birth and the President
had used his executive power to deny a Jerusalem resident this statutory right.81
On the other hand, Breyer’s invocation of the political remedies doctrine
after both branches of government have asserted their rights and reached a
constitutional impasse raises important questions. What more did Breyer expect
the political branches to do? How much political action should courts applying
the political remedies doctrine require before acting?82
B. The Political Remedies Doctrine in the Lower Courts
The political remedies doctrine has played a key role in shielding alleged
presidential usurpation of congressional authority from judicial scrutiny in the
lower courts. The lower courts first applied the doctrine primarily to war powers
cases and then more recently to President Trump’s challenges to the
constitutional order.
1. War Powers Cases
The Constitution grants the power to declare war to Congress.83 Since World
War II, however, presidents have initiated combat operations around the world
unilaterally on numerous occasions. Beginning with the Vietnam War,
congressmen, soldiers, owners of property damaged in war, and others have
asked the federal courts to recognize that the President exceeds his constitutional
authority when he deploys the military without a congressional declaration of
war.84 The lower courts have consistently treated these claims as nonjusticiable,
and the Supreme Court has refused to review the lower court decisions.85
81

Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. at 191–93.
Cf. Meyer, supra note 42, at 69 (claiming that the political remedies doctrine can always justify
foregoing judicial review and is incompatible with the Pocket Veto cases).
83
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
84
See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (suit by soldiers, parents of soldiers, and
members of the House seeking to prevent the war against Iraq); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (suit by members of the House of Representatives challenging the Vietnam War, waged without a
declaration of war by Congress).
85
See, e.g., McKaye Neumeister, Reviving the Power of the Purse: Appropriations Clause Litigation and
National Security Law, 127 YALE L.J. 2512, 2523–24 (2018) (“Members of Congress have . . . brought twelve
. . . lawsuits” contesting presidential usurpation of the war power, but the courts have dismissed them all as
82
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Collectively, these decisions have played a role in the de facto transfer of the
war power to the President. While the Constitution clearly demands peace unless
the President, the Senate, and the House agree to war, current practice allows the
President to wage war unless and until both Houses of Congress agree to stop
him (perhaps even by a supermajority, as a presidential veto remains possible).86
The political remedies doctrine has played a role in a number of the cases
authorizing presidential usurpation of the war power through judicial inaction.87
While it played a role in at least one case arising before Goldwater,88 its primary
role has been to sustain the courts’ refusal to adjudicate war powers cases after
some of the other excuses for not hearing these cases have lost credibility.
Many of the Vietnam War cases rely upon the political question doctrine,
not on the political remedies doctrine.89 And the rulings in many of those cases
were unanimous.90 Nevertheless, the rationales for these rulings appear weak,
and recent cases either tend to generate split decisions or do not rely on them at
all.91
An early case arising from the Vietnam War, Massachusetts v. Laird,
however, counts as a forerunner of the political remedies doctrine.92 In that case,
Massachusetts and soldiers from that state alleged that forcing young men to
fight in Vietnam violated their liberty interests under the Due Process Clause
nonjusticiable); Sarnoff v. Schultz, 409 U.S. 929 (1972); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Mora v.
McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) .
86
See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) (stating that “Congress alone has the power to
declare . . . war” and the President “has no power to initiate or declare . . . war”); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (Marshall, J.) (unanimous) (the Constitution vests “the whole powers of war” in Congress).
87
Cf. Meyer, supra note 42, at 71–72 (explaining that the courts’ invocation of the political remedies
doctrine in the war powers area has upended the Framers’ intent to use legislative deliberation to inhibit “solo
and possibly precipitous . . . action”).
88
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971).
89
See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615–16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding the question of whether the
Vietnam War is constitutional a political question because Congress can choose the form of approving the war
and the court cannot second guess President Nixon’s effort to end the war); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039,
1043 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding the question of whether congressional approval of the Vietnam War was in the
proper form a political question); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (holding
that the constitutionality of the method of “winding down” the Vietnam War is a political question); Luftig v.
McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (holding that the legality of the Vietnam War constitutes
a political question because it involves foreign policy and military power).
90
See Mitchell, 488 F.2d 611; Orlando, 443 F.2d 1039; DaCosta, 448 F.2d 1368; Luftig, 373 F.2d 664.
91
See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding 54 that the political question doctrine barred consideration of a federal tort claim seeking damages for U.S.
bombing of a pharmaceutical plant); Samuel R. Howe, Note, Congress’s War Powers and the Political Question
Doctrine After Smith v. Obama, 68 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1234 (2019) (referencing Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d
283 (D.D.C. 2016)) (questioning the Smith v. Obama court’s use of the political question doctrine).
92
Laird, 451 F.2d 26; accord Blumoff, supra note 14, at 303 (recognizing that Judge Coffin’s Laird
opinion anticipated Justice Powell’s Goldwater opinion).
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absent a declaration of war.93 The First Circuit stated that, absent congressional
opposition to the Vietnam War, “there is no necessity of determining
boundaries.”94 It invoked the political remedies doctrine in this way after noting
that Congress had steadily supported the Vietnam War, albeit not through a
specific war authorization.95
Laird reveals an important aspect of the politics preference, which it
endorses.96 By allowing political agreement to defeat a due process claim, the
court allowed political consensus to infringe liberty in a very serious way.
The Vietnam War also spurred suits by congressmen, who argued that
several Presidents had usurped Congress’ war power by waging war in
Vietnam.97 These cases and other cases occasioned by increased strife with the
executive branch led to a confused D.C. Circuit doctrine on congressional
standing.98 In 1981, the D.C. Circuit tried to address the confusion by adopting
the political remedies doctrine under the rubric of equitable discretion, after
rejecting the applicability of the other justiciability doctrines.99 Thus, judges
employ the political remedies doctrine under the rubrics of ripeness, political
questions, standing, and equitable discretion.100
By the time of the Reagan administration, dismissal of war powers cases
based on unanimous appellate political question doctrine rulings seldom
93

Laird, 451 F.2d at 28.
Id. at 34.
95
See id.
96
See id. (holding that the President’s conduct of the War “with steady Congressional support” does not
violate the Constitution).
97
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (thirteen members of the House brought
suit to challenge the plaintiffs’ waging of war in Vietnam without the required congressional declaration of war).
98
See Nash, supra note 14, at 358–59 (discussing “confusion” in the D.C. Circuit’s approach to standing).
99
See Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that “[w]here a
congressional plaintiff could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators through enactment, repeal, or
amendment of a statute, this court should exercise its equitable discretion to dismiss the legislator’s action” after
declining to employ standing, ripeness, or the political question doctrine); Dornan v. U.S. Sec’y of Def., 851
F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (dismissing a challenge to aiding the Nicaraguan Contras based on the
political remedies doctrine camouflaged as equitable discretion). The Riegle court read the Goldwater opinion
as disapproving of congressional standing doctrine predicated on political remedies type reasoning. See Riegle,
656 F.2d at 880. The doctrine of equitable discretion is poorly defined, but basically gives a court flexibility to
refuse to issue an equitable remedy based on a balancing of competing factors. See Wagner, supra note 15, at
540–41. The lower courts, however, employ equitable discretion mechanically in this context and do not
“balance[] . . . competing factors.” Id. at 541. See generally Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New
Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 244 (1981) (offering the doctrine of equitable discretion as an alternative to the
standing, political question, and ripeness doctrines in addressing separation of powers concerns in congressional
lawsuits).
100
See, e.g., Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 302–03 (D.D.C. 2016) (employing the political
remedies doctrine to help justify a dismissal ostensibly based on the political question doctrine).
94
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occurred anymore, and the political remedies doctrine began to play a more
prominent role.101 Judge (later, Justice) Ginsburg declined to sign on to an
opinion relying on the political question doctrine to reject a claim that President
Reagan had unconstitutionally waged war against the government of Nicaragua
by supporting the Contra forces.102 Instead, she relied on the political remedies
doctrine.103 She identified some of the political remedies that Congress could
invoke to contest President Reagan’s role in the war in Nicaragua—the power
of the purse and to investigate.104 Noting a congressional appropriation to
support the Contras, she did not find a constitutional impasse that would justify
judicial review under the political remedies doctrine.105
In Conyers v. Reagan, the District Court for the District of Columbia invoked
the political remedies doctrine in dismissing a challenge to President Reagan’s
invasion of Grenada.106 A few years later, in Dellums v. Bush, the same court
relied squarely on the political remedies doctrine to dismiss a war powers case,
while rejecting defenses based on the political question and standing
doctrines.107 The political remedies doctrine justified refusing to order President
Bush to refrain from waging war against Iraq, which had just invaded Kuwait,
without congressional authorization.108 Judge Greene’s Dellums opinion reveals
some of the consequences of accepting the politics preference underlying the
doctrine. First of all, his reasoning maintains that Congress may amend the
Constitution through its inaction.109 He strongly suggested that if Congress
thinks that the Constitution authorizes unilateral war and therefore does nothing,
then the President should be allowed to proceed, even if Congress is wrong.110
101
See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (approving dismissal of an effort
to enforce the War Powers Resolution under the doctrine of equitable discretion—i.e., the political remedies
doctrine). But see Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 339 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that the question of whether
President Reagan had introduced armed forces into hostilities in the Persian Gulf thereby triggering the War
Powers Resolution constitutes a political question).
102
See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (majority opinion) (dismissing
congressional challenges to the U.S. role in the war in Nicaragua on political question grounds).
103
See id. at 210–11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Powell’s statement in Goldwater that the courts
should not adjudicate “issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the
political branches reach a constitutional impasse” (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979))). The
majority did not address this issue, as it considered it abandoned. See id. at 208 n.9.
104
Id. at 211.
105
Id.
106
Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324, 326 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal dismissed as moot, 765 F.2d 1124
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
107
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144–52 (D.D.C. 1990).
108
Id. at 1143.
109
Cf. Meyer, supra note 42, at 72 (claiming that the political remedies doctrine enables the political
branches to alter the Constitution without going through the amendment process mandated by Article V).
110
See Dellums, 725 F. Supp. at 1150–51. Judge Greene discussed what should happen if the court
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Other district courts used the political remedies doctrine not to avoid the
political question doctrine, but to bolster it. In Obama v. Smith, the District Court
for the District of Columbia invoked the political remedies doctrine to help
justify stating that the political question doctrine barred judicial review of a
challenge to the war against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.111
The political remedies doctrine also played a role in Doe v. Bush, which
rejected challenges to the constitutional sufficiency of a congressional resolution
authorizing President George W. Bush to go to war in Iraq under certain
conditions.112 The First Circuit quoted Powell’s endorsement of the political
remedies doctrine in addressing some of the issues raised in that challenge but
seemed aware of its insecure placement in the ripeness doctrine.113 It prefaced
the Powell quote by grounding its decision not only on the lack of an interbranch
dispute, but also on “the consequent lack of a clearly defined issue.”114 It also
found the case unripe because the war might not occur, a view aligned with
ripeness doctrine’s traditional concern about deciding hypothetical cases—cases
that have no real world impact.115 The political remedies doctrine acted to
influence, but perhaps not wholly determine, a ripeness ruling with many
elements on some of the claims before the court.116 At the same time, the Doe
court rejected invocation of the political remedies doctrine in addressing a claim
that Congress may not delegate the war power to the President because Congress
must take political responsibility for deciding whether to go to war or not.117 It
dismissed that claim on other grounds.118
Toward the end of the Vietnam War, Congress did use a political remedy to
check the President’s usurpation of its war power by passing the War Powers
Resolution.119 The War Powers Resolution requires the President to notify

enjoined the War in Iraq, presumably on the ground that the President could not initiate a war without
congressional authorization, but the majority in Congress thought the Constitution authorized unilateral war. Id.
at 1150. That injunction would not be proper, wrote Judge Greene, because it would force Congress to make a
choice about whether to authorize the war. Id. at 1150–51. But this means that the President could engage in
unilateral war unauthorized by the Constitution only because Congress thought he could.
111
Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 302–03 (D.D.C. 2016). The Smith Court also relied on a lack of
standing. See id. at 289–97.
112
Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134, 144 (1st Cir. 2003).
113
Id. at 137 (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979)).
114
Id.
115
See id. at 139 (identifying the question of “whether there will be a war” as “unanswered”).
116
See id. at 137–41 (intermingling consideration of the political remedies doctrine with more traditional
ripeness concerns).
117
See id. at 141.
118
See id. at 141–44.
119
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548.
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Congress within forty-eight hours of the introduction of troops abroad.120 And it
obligates the President to remove troops within two months of the reporting
deadline, unless Congress authorizes the President to leave them in place.121
Thus, one might have expected the courts to treat actions challenging
presidential failure to comply with the War Powers Resolution as asking for
judicial resolution of a constitutional impasse and therefore to at least eschew
reliance on the political remedies doctrine as a basis for dismissing these
challenges.122
In Campbell v. Clinton, however, the D.C. Circuit dismissed an action to
enforce the War Powers Resolution based, in part, on the political remedies
doctrine.123 In Campbell, several congressmen sued President Clinton for
bombing Kosovo without notifying Congress as required by the War Powers
Resolution.124 Furthermore, Congress employed additional political remedies to
reign in this particular unilateral war. It voted against a declaration of war and
an authorization of air strikes.125 On the other hand, it voted against requiring
the President to immediately end his unilateral participation and funded the
involvement.126
The Campbell court held that the congressmen lacked standing to sue.127
While the court might have distinguished the Raines congressional standing
ruling on the grounds that Congressman Campbell and his allies sought to
vindicate Congress’ political decision rather than ask the court to invalidate one,
it relied instead on the political remedies doctrine to bolster its standing ruling.128
The court relied squarely on D.C. Circuit congressional standing precedent
justifying, according to the majority, dismissal of disputes “fully susceptible to
political resolution.”129 And in explaining why it read Raines restrictively
instead of relying on earlier precedent granting standing to legislators, the court
relied on the existence of a potential legislative remedy addressing the bombing

120

50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 895 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
122
Cf. Meyer, supra note 42, at 124 (characterizing invocation of the political remedies doctrine to dismiss
efforts to enforce the War Powers Resolution as “peculiar”).
123
203 F.3d 19, 19–21 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
124
See id. at 20.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 19.
128
Cf. id. at 31–32 (Randolph, J., concurring) (summarizing the majority’s position as relying on the
political remedies doctrine to deny congressmen’s standing to enforce the War Powers Resolution because
Congress could take additional action).
129
Id. at 21 (quoting Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
121
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of Kosovo—passing a law ordering the troops home.130 Toward the end of its
opinion, the court also mentions congressional authority to “cut off funds” and
impeach the President.131 In the context of the case’s facts, Campbell held that
even when Congress has employed legislative remedies denying a war power to
the President, the political remedies doctrine still applies if Congress could do
more. That proved a bit too much for Judge Randolph, who wrote a concurring
opinion treating the possibility of voting “for other legislation in the future” on
the same matter as an insufficient basis for triggering the political remedies
doctrine once Congress has taken some action.132 He pointed out that such an
approach to congressional standing eliminates it.133 The Campbell majority
emphatically read Raines as making congressional standing doctrine a tool for
implementing the political remedies doctrine.134
2. President Trump’s Challenges to the Constitution
In a number of cases, President Trump has challenged the constitutional
order by breaking long-standing constitutional norms.135 Many of his broader
challenges triggered efforts to enforce the constitutional norms in question and
statutes implementing them.136 But several lower courts invoked the political
remedies doctrine to avoid enforcing the relevant constitutional norms. The
cases seeking to reign in Trump’s undermining of the constitutional order led to
a revealing debate among the lower court judges about the proper scope of the
political remedies doctrine. This subpart examines cases involving Trump’s
resistance to the Emoluments Clauses, congressional subpoenas, and restrictions
on funding a wall on the U.S. southern border in turn.

130
Id. at 23 (the Senators in Coleman v. Miller obtained standing because “they had no legislative remedy,”
but Campbell and his allies “enjoy ample legislative power to” stop the war’s “prosecution”).
131
Id.
132
See id. at 32 (Randolph, J., concurring) (disapproving of ignoring nullification of previous votes just
because of the possibility of additional votes in the future on the same matter).
133
See id. (because “[m]embers will always be able to vote for [additional] legislation[,] . . . the majority’s
decision . . . abolish[es] legislative standing”).
134
See id. at 24 (reading Raines as focusing on “self-help available to congressmen”); see also Kucinich
v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 120 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing congressmen’s war power claims and making
the lack of a legislative remedy a prerequisite for congressional standing).
135
See, e.g., David M. Driesen, President Trump’s Executive Orders and the Rule of Law, 87 UMKC L.
REV. 489, 497–506 (2019) (reviewing Trump’s executive orders challenging the constitutional order early in his
administration); Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2214, 2219–21
(2018) (discussing Trump’s norm violations). Unlike Daphna Renan, I use the term “norms” to refer both to
informal and formal legal constraints. Cf. Renan, supra, at 2189.
136
See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated
as moot, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (2021) (addressing claims that President Trump violated the Constitution’s Emoluments
Clauses); Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018).
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a. Emoluments Clause Cases
One set of cases arose out of Trump’s defiance of the Constitution’s
Emoluments Clauses, which forbid the President from accepting “emoluments”
(anything of value) from a foreign government or from the government of the
United States (excepting his salary).137 The Foreign Emoluments Clause has an
exception authorizing the President to accept an emolument from a foreign
government if Congress consents.138 These provisions aim to prevent corruption
of the President.139 President Trump allegedly violated the Emoluments Clauses
primarily by owning a number of hotels frequented by government officials and
representatives of foreign governments, including one leased from the federal
government.140
A district court dismissing complaints about Trump’s alleged violations
relied, in part, on the political remedies doctrine.141 Because, in the court’s view,
Congress can enforce the Foreign Emoluments Clause through legislation or by
approving emoluments, the judge dismissed the Foreign Emoluments Clause
claim.142 In doing so, the court relied not only on Goldwater itself, but also on
Dellums, the war powers case relying exclusively on the political remedies
doctrine.143 Thus, a doctrine justifying staying out of foreign affairs cases and
used to avoid checking unilateral war-making generated a separation of powers
logic favoring politics over the rule of law domestically by hindering
enforcement of a constitutional restraint limiting presidential corruption.
But not for long. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s opinion,
including its reliance on the political remedies doctrine.144 It explained that the
political remedies doctrine applies only to separation of powers cases.145 Since
the Foreign Emoluments Clause claim only concerned the question of whether

137
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; art. II, § 1, cl. 7; NORMAN L. EISEN, RICHARD PAINTER & LAURENCE
TRIBE, THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: ITS TEXT, MEANING, AND APPLICATION TO DONALD J. TRUMP 6 (2016)
(characterizing the Emoluments Clause as aimed at preventing “gifts of any kind from a foreign government”).
Contra Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions and President Trump’s Emoluments Problem, 40 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 760 (2017) (doubting this interpretation).
138
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
139
In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 373 (4th Cir. 2019), vacated as moot, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (2021) (characterizing
the Emoluments Clauses as “structural provisions concerned with public corruption”).
140
Id. at 364–65.
141
Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
142
Id.
143
See id. (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) and Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141,
1149–50 (D.D.C. 1990)).
144
See Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 178, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2019).
145
See id.
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President Trump transgressed an ethical limitation on his conduct, rather than a
question of whether the President encroached on a power of Congress, it rejected
the applicability of the political remedies doctrine.146
In Blumenthal v. Trump, a district court declined to use the political remedies
doctrine to bar enforcement of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, partly on
grounds similar to those relied on in the Second Circuit and partly because the
court found the political remedies that President Trump relied upon inadequate
and constitutionally inappropriate.147 Blumenthal evaluates the realism of the
political remedies suggested to justify invocation of the political remedies
doctrine. The court noted that the President may veto legislation enforcing the
Emoluments Clause.148 Moreover, it declined to assume that the President would
comply with the legislation, as he had not complied with the constitutional
provision governing foreign emoluments.149 The judge also cited the problem of
legislating without information about the President’s emoluments.150 Finally, the
court rejected reliance on “the extreme measure of impeachment” as an adequate
political remedy within the meaning of the political remedies doctrine.151
Even more importantly for this Article, Blumenthal recognizes that a
political remedies doctrine dismissal would itself allocate power in a manner
inconsistent with the Foreign Emoluments Clause and that doing so would
change the terms of political bargaining.152 That Clause forbids taking an
emolument without congressional consent.153 A judicial decision recognizing
that the President must receive congressional consent before taking an
emolument would not cut off bargaining but instead would “place[] the burden
on the President to convince . . . Congress to consent.”154 Dismissal based on the
availability of a political remedy would reverse this allocation of power and
therefore change the baseline for negotiations. It would allow the President to
keep the corrupting emolument unless Congress acted to stop it.155 This ruling
exposes the problem of evaluating the adequacy of political remedies and, even

146

See id.
See Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 66–68 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 949 F.3d
14 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
148
See id. at 67 (assuming that the President would sign legislation enforcing the Emoluments Clause for
purposes of argument).
149
See id.
150
Id. at 68.
151
Id.
152
See id. at 67.
153
Id.
154
See id.
155
See id.
147
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more fundamentally, recognizes that a ruling on the political remedies doctrine
allocates power in a way that changes constitutional balances.156
b. Subpoena Cases
The political remedies doctrine had a larger impact on cases addressing
President Trump’s resistance to congressional subpoenas. Congress has
demanded documents and witnesses from the executive branch since the
Founding, and while disputes have arisen from the beginning about specific
requests, the executive branch typically complies with most congressional
requests for information.157 The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that
Congress has broad authority to subpoena information from the executive
branch.158 Yet, President Trump claimed authority to resist all sorts of
subpoenas, thereby triggering enforcement actions in the federal courts.159
These cases reveal much about the potential breadth of the political remedies
doctrine. The executive branch sought to rely on the political remedies doctrine
to resist a House Judiciary Committee subpoena demanding that White House
Counsel Donald McGahn testify about Russian interference in the 2016 election
and the Special Counsel’s findings of fact about presidential obstruction of
justice.160 In spite of the political remedies doctrine’s role in justifying shrinking

156
See infra pp. 46–51 (justifying the court’s conclusion that the political remedies doctrine changes
constitutional balances); cf. Wagner, supra note 15, at 536 (noting that broad abstention from lawsuits brought
by congressmen can “alter the constitutional balance”).
157
See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927) (tracing the practice of securing information
needed by Congress back to 1792 and noting the support of James Madison and four other Framers); see, e.g.,
In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 665–66 (1897) (discussing a statute passed in 1857 requiring witnesses summoned
by a House of Congress or one of its committees to appear and answer questions posed).
158
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 194–95, 200 n.33 (1956) (characterizing McGrain and Sinclair
as recognizing congressional authority to encourage “honest and effective government” by investigating
corruption and noting established authority to police maladministration); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263,
294–95 (1929) (upholding imprisonment of an oil company executive who did not fully cooperate in
congressional investigation of an oil leasing scandal because the investigation might produce legislation);
McGrain, 273 U.S. at 150–51, 154, 177–80 (approving the arrest of the former Attorney General for failing to
cooperate with a congressional investigation of a failure to enforce anti-trust laws and other statutes); Senate
Select Comm. on Pres. Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 727, 731–32 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc)
(approving demand for tapes revealing presidential misconduct in an election by a committee that might
recommend legislation, which became a basis for an impeachment investigation); cf. Trump v. Mazars, 140 S.
Ct. 2019, 2035–36 (2020) (imposing various limitations on Congressional subpoenas seeking personal financial
information from the President).
159
See Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2028–29 (detailing presidential challenges to congressional subpoenas of his
financial records); Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020) (upholding a state’s right to subpoena the
President’s financial records).
160
Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 153 (D.D.C. 2019) (explaining that President
Trump ordered McGahn not to testify).
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standing for individual congressmen in Raines, a district court declined to treat
the alleged existence of political remedies as a defense to an action brought by
an entire House Committee to vindicate its subpoena power.161 Having found
that the Judiciary Committee had incurred an injury, it refused to read the
political remedies requirement as a stand-alone addition to traditional standing
requirements.162 The judge also evaluated the realism of the political remedy
McGahn relied on—use of the Spending Power to enforce subpoenas—and
found it impracticable.163
A panel of the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, with the political
remedies doctrine playing a significant role in its decision.164 Like the district
court, the panel named some specific remedies. But it did not confine itself to
remedies available to the Judiciary Committee or even to the House. It cited
congressional power to “hold officers in contempt, withhold appropriations,
refuse to confirm the President’s nominees, or impeach recalcitrant officers.”165
It offered no evaluation of the reasonableness or practical availability of these
remedies. Even though this case presented a constitutional impasse of the sort
that Justice Powell had suggested would be justiciable, the panel declined to
adjudicate the merits lest it disrupt “the flexible system of negotiation,
accommodation, and (sometimes) political retaliation” that usually resolves such
disputes.166
The entire D.C. Circuit, however, reversed the panel decision in a 6-2
opinion.167 Like the District Court, it declined to treat the political remedies
doctrine as a defense.168 Importantly, the en banc court viewed merits
adjudication as supporting, rather than disrupting, the tradition of bargaining
over information disclosure to Congress.169 It rejected the argument that judicial
161
See id. at 196–97 (citation omitted) (the argument that the Judiciary Committee has “several political
arrows in its quiver” does not defeat standing because Article III standing does not have a “last resort”
requirement).
162
See id. at 197.
163
See id. (characterizing the remedy of withholding appropriations as a “practical nullity” because of the
time required and the need for “the cooperation of the entire Congress”).
164
Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 518–19 (D.C. Cir. 2020), rev’d, 968 F.3d 755, 760,
778 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc).
165
Id. at 519.
166
Id.
167
See Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc).
168
See id. at 769–70 (rejecting the idea of incorporating a general reluctance to intervene in separation of
powers cases into standing doctrine and distinguishing the leading case articulating the political remedies
doctrine as a test of the exercise of equitable discretion (citing Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873,
881 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
169
Id. at 770 (concluding that enforcing the subpoena “would preserve, rather than disrupt, [the] historical
practice of accommodation”).
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enforcement of subpoenas would “dramatically alter” the respective “bargaining
positions” of the two political branches.170 Instead, it pointed out that “the threat
of a subpoena enforcement lawsuit may be an essential tool in keeping the
Executive Branch at the negotiating table.”171 The court also doubted that the
ability to enforce a subpoena in court would lead Congress to eschew
negotiation, since negotiation and compromise usually offer much quicker relief
than adjudication.172 The court noted that the Committee issued the McGahn
subpoena “over 15 months” before its decision (which only produced a remand,
not a final resolution) and that a session of Congress lasts only two years.173
The political remedies doctrine has also played a role in securing dismissal
of claims brought by members of the House Oversight Committee to enforce a
subpoena of records regarding President Trump’s lease of the Old Post Office
building in Washington, D.C., which houses the Trump International Hotel.174
Because the members seeking enforcement derived their authority from a federal
statute authorizing any seven members of the Oversight Committee to subpoena
records from the executive branch, the members relied on the statute in arguing
for standing to enforce their demand.175 The District Court, relying in part on the
political remedies doctrine, held that the members lacked standing to enforce
their subpoena.176 It pointed out that even though they had authority to issue a
subpoena under federal law and had done so, they could have tried to convince
the Oversight Committee as a whole to endorse their demands and sought
endorsement of their litigation from the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group.177
The court explicitly rejected a political realism constraint on the political
remedies doctrine. It admitted that these remedies were not readily available to
the congressmen, who were then part of the minority on the Oversight
Committee.178 It stated that the difficulty of employing a political remedy “does
not automatically swing open the doors to the federal courts.”179 To buttress this
conclusion it cited the Campbell Court’s mention of the impeachment option,

170

Id. at 771.
Id.
172
See id. at 772 (acknowledging that litigation is not politicians’ preferred option because of the time
required to resolve cases).
173
Id.
174
See Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 95–96 (D.D.C. 2018).
175
See id. at 95, 106.
176
See id. at 117–18.
177
See id. at 117.
178
See id. (admitting that “had these paths been readily available, plaintiffs would not have filed this
action”).
179
Id.
171
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thereby suggesting that the courthouse doors would remain firmly shut.180 After
all, if a litigant can only challenge a president’s allegedly unconstitutional
conduct after his removal from office, that removal might well moot the case.181
This citation to Campbell further illustrates how the political remedies doctrine
in war powers cases has created impediments to enforcing the rule of law
domestically and how those impediments might in practice become a categorical
prohibition on enforcement of statutes. The D.C. Circuit reversed this decision
just weeks before President Trump left office, treating the minorities’ statutorily
created right to information as a sufficient basis to establish standing.182
The Supreme Court did not mention the political remedies doctrine when it
considered congressional subpoenas seeking disclosure of President Trump’s
tax returns and other financial information in Trump v. Mazars.183 It proceeded
straight to the merits and crafted fresh limitations on the congressional subpoena
power as applied to presidential information.184
c.

The Power of the Purse: Trump’s Wall

Another case invoking the political remedies doctrine stemmed from a battle
over congressional control of the purse. During the 2016 presidential campaign,
Trump promised to build a wall on the U.S. southern border in order to keep out
illegal immigrants.185 After criticism from right wing media for failure to fulfill
his campaign promise, President Trump demanded $5.7 billion to build his wall
and threatened to veto an appropriations bill if Congress did not provide full
funding.186 Congress refused and the “longest partial government shutdown” in

180

Id.
Cf. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring) (arguing that
dismissal based on the mere availability of an option to impeach, legislate, or cut-off funding will justify
dismissal even if Congress has acted); Nash, supra note 14, at 363 (noting that “[s]ince impeachment is
technically always available,” invoking its availability to deny standing would “render standing virtually
unavailable for any claims of federal legislators”).
182
Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
183
140 S. Ct. 2019, 2026 (2020).
184
See id. at 2035–36 (authorizing lower courts to second guess congressional determinations about what
information it needs to inform its legislative processes).
185
See Sierra Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883, 891 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Donald Trump, U.S.
President, Presidential Announcement Speech (June 26, 2016)) (stating that the President has “long voiced
support for” a border wall).
186
See id. at 892 (stating that President Trump announced that he would not sign any federal legislation
that failed to provide “substantial funds” for the wall); U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp.
3d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2019), rev’d, 969 F.3d 353, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (citations omitted) (explaining that
Trump had sought $5.7 billion for a border wall and that a “protracted public fight” over funding the wall led to
a government shutdown).
181
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history ensued.187 In the wake of the public furor over the shutdown, Congress
and the President resolved this impasse by agreement to a $1.375 billion
appropriation for fencing along the Rio Grande Valley.188
Trump then invoked emergency powers to circumvent the funding
limitation.189 In order to retain its power of the purse, Congress passed a joint
resolution to void the President’s emergency declaration, which President
Trump vetoed.190 The House of Representatives sued to stop the alleged
misappropriation of funds, claiming that the statutory authority relied on in the
emergency proclamation does not authorize expenditures to build a wall and that
therefore the President violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause.191
The District Court dismissed the suit, relying on a narrow reading of
congressional standing doctrine.192 Incredibly, the Court relied on the political
remedies doctrine to bolster its congressional standing ruling, apparently not
considering a government shutdown and presidential defiance of a subsequent
congressional resolution sufficient to indicate a constitutional impasse. It noted
that Congress could, with a two-thirds majority, overcome the President’s veto
of the joint resolution seeking to void Trump’s order creating a national
emergency.193 Congress could amend the sections that allegedly fail to justify
Trump’s redeployment of funds to expressly prohibit the use of funds to build
the wall.194 And, the court added, Congress can investigate the administration’s
conduct or expand private remedies for damages for private parties harmed by
building the wall.195 The court applied a variant of the political remedies doctrine
that requires that the House prove “complete nullification” of its power before
it would have standing to sue to vindicate its rights.196 Although the Court did
not find complete nullification, it did recognize the appropriateness of private
lawsuits to vindicate the same interests.197 The entire D.C. Circuit, however,
reversed this ruling.198

187

Sierra Club, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 892.
Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 11.
189
Id.
190
See id.
191
Id. at 11–12.
192
See id. at 13–19.
193
See id. at 20.
194
See id. at 12, 20.
195
Id. at 20.
196
See id. at 21.
197
See id. at 22; cf. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 950 (9th Cir. 2020) (invalidating transfer of funds
to build a section of the wall at the behest of a number of states).
198
See U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 969 F.3d 353, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc).
188
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We can see that the political remedies doctrine has enjoyed more influence
in the lower courts than in the Supreme Court. It has helped supply rationales
for allowing allegedly unconstitutional presidential exercise of the congressional
war power to continue without judicial scrutiny. More recently, it has played a
role in rejecting several challenges to President Trump’s assault on the
constitutional order. The invocation in the foreign affairs context has led to
employment of the doctrine in the domestic law context. The domestic political
remedies doctrine rulings played a role in preventing the courts from effectively
countering some of President Trump’s constitutional abuses. The remainder of
this Article suggests that the doctrine has potential to unravel the rule of law
domestically just as it has helped unravel the constitutional order respecting the
war power.
II. POLITICAL REMEDIES AND THE RULE OF LAW
This Part evaluates the political remedies doctrine’s potential to undermine
the rule of law. It begins by showing that the doctrine, while framed in neutral
terms, only bars review of presidential action, not congressional acts. As a result,
it allows the courts to overturn political agreements between Congress and the
President resolving separation of powers claims while permitting unilateral
presidential usurpation of congressional authority to go unchecked if the
President commands enough support in Congress to block legislation. It then
evaluates the extent of the doctrine’s potential to unravel the rule of law,
primarily by analyzing Justice Scalia’s dissent in United States v. Windsor.199
A. The Political Remedies Doctrine’s Asymmetry
The courts always frame the political remedies doctrine in neutral terms.
Justice Powell articulates it as a principle that a court should not adjudicate a
“dispute between Congress and the President . . . until . . . each branch has taken
action asserting its constitutional authority.”200 This framing indicates that when
the President acts, the courts should not intervene until Congress passes
legislation seeking to correct an alleged presidential usurpation of power.
Conversely, it suggests that the President must act before the courts will review
an alleged congressional encroachment on presidential authority.
The federal courts, however, never seriously consider applying the political
remedies doctrine to shield congressional action from review. The primary

199
200

570 U.S. 744, 778–91 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 997, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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power that the President has to resist congressional encroachment on his
authority is the veto power.201 The Court has never made exercise of that power
a prerequisite to judicial review of legislation alleged to violate the separation
of powers.
For example, take INS v. Chadha.202 In that case, the Court held that the oneHouse veto enacted into law by Congress with presidential consent in hundreds
of statutes violates the Constitution.203 The Court never suggested that repeated
presidential decisions over decades not to veto the legislative acts containing a
one-House veto precluded judicial review.204 It did not accept the idea that the
politics preference should influence the result in that case. Justice White’s
dissent pointed out that legislative vetoes constitute a negotiated price for
delegations of vast authority to the executive branch.205 But the Chadha Court
decided to “determine boundaries” in this case, even though the executive
branch took no “action asserting its constitutional authority.”206
One can easily multiply examples of non-barking dogs.207 The courts have
permitted litigants to challenge federal statutes impinging on claimed executive
authority over and over again, even if the President declined to issue a veto. Nor
have the courts ever insisted on some other presidential exertion of authority as
a prerequisite to judicial review.
This asymmetry does not stem solely from the infrequency with which the
executive branch acts as a plaintiff suing Congress. The courts employ the
political remedies doctrine to avoid limiting presidential power in cases private
parties and states bring, as some of the Emoluments Clause and war powers
cases show.208 While courts often follow the doctrine in the context of
201
See Grove, supra note 14, at 644 (describing the President’s powers to veto or refuse to enforce
legislation as “mechanisms to assert their constitutional powers”).
202
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
203
Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting) (stating the majority decision in Chadha “sounds the death knell for
nearly 200 . . . statutory provisions” containing a legislative veto).
204
Cf. Grove, supra note 14, at 648 (noting that Presidents Carter and Reagan “complained . . . that the
veto was unconstitutional” and “threatened to disregard some legislative vetoes of administrative actions”).
205
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968–69 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (describing the legislative veto
as predicated on a proposal by President Hoover to justify delegation of authority to the executive branch).
206
Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that “a dispute
between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless. . . . each branch has taken action
asserting its constitutional authority”) (emphasis added); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1971)
(finding no need for the court to “determin[e] boundaries” when Congress has not sought to stop a war that the
President initiated).
207
See infra notes 264-68.
208
See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2017),
vacated, 939 F.3d 131 (2019), modified, 953 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated as moot 141 S. Ct. 1262 (2021)
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congressional standing rulings, they also use it in rulings invoking ripeness,
standing, and equitable discretion. Nothing in the doctrine formally precludes its
use to stop private lawsuits challenging congressional actions, but the courts
simply never apply it in that context.209
This asymmetry tilts the constitutional balance of power toward the
President.210 And presidential power over the last century has been growing for
a host of reasons identified by historians and, for that matter, by Justice Jackson
in his Youngstown concurrence—delegation of vast authority to the President,
presidential exploitation of mass communication technologies, the President’s
role as party leader, the challenges of the Cold War and the War on Terror, and
the emergence of the United States as a world power.211 So, the Court’s political
remedies doctrine exacerbates a trend toward aggrandizement of presidential
power.212
B. The Rule of Law and the Windsor Dissent
Part II suggests that some federal courts have gone quite far in using the
political remedies doctrine to liberate the President from the rule of law. It
canvasses the doctrine’s use to evade enforcement of statutes limiting executive
branch expenditures, congressional subpoenas, the Constitution’s ethics
requirements, and a federal statute implementing the congressional power to
(invoking the political remedies doctrine to deny a private non-profit a request for enforcement of the
Emoluments Clause); Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 302–03 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated as moot, Smith v.
Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (employing the political remedies doctrine to help justify dismissal in
a case brought by an army captain); Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134, 137 (1st Cir. 2003) (invoking the doctrine
in a case brought by soldiers, soldiers’ parents, and congressmen); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 28, 34
(1st Cir. 1971) (invoking the political remedies doctrine idea in a case brought by a state and individual soldiers).
209
See, e.g., Seila Law L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (CFPB), 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2196–97 (2020)
(not invoking the political remedies doctrine and rejecting justiciability objections to adjudicating the
constitutionality of statutory restrictions on presidential removal authority even though the President did not
seek to remove the CFPB Director).
210
See Wagner, supra note 15, at 538–39 (broad judicial abstention from congressional lawsuits
encourages Presidents to “usurp congressional authority” adding to executive authority and “weakening of the
separation of powers”).
211
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653–54 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(describing the President’s power as more potent than the Framers envisioned because of his command of mass
communication and his role as a party leader); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 105–
07, 135 (1973) (finding the President’s powers “dangerously enlarged” because of US influence on foreign
affairs and delegation of authority by Congress).
212
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2322 n.21 (2006) (describing how severely divided government has led to “a
massive increase in executive power”); see, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 589–91 (2014) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (noting increased recent use of recess appointments in response to a single Attorney General’s
legal opinion).
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declare war. Some courts have resisted the domestic applications, but these
applications reveal that the doctrine’s potential to unravel the rule of law is quite
great. One wonders whether the President can escape his duty to faithfully
execute any law by simply claiming that Congress could employ political
remedies.
As it happens, Justice Scalia’s dissent in United States v. Windsor advocates
an approach to the political remedies doctrine that proves almost that broad.213
In Windsor, a same sex couple successfully challenged the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), which forbade federal recognition of state sanctioned same sex
marriages as incompatible with equal protection of the laws and due process.214
The case presented a justiciability issue because the Obama administration
refused to defend DOMA in the Supreme Court, thereby creating a question
about whether a case or controversy existed.215 Justice Scalia’s dissent from the
Court’s decision to find a case or controversy suggested that the judiciary should
not remedy presidential abrogation of statutes.
Scalia’s Windsor dissent claims that the President may properly decline to
enforce or defend a statute that he finds unconstitutional.216 The failure to
implement the statute deprives the people it injures of standing, but that is fine,
wrote Justice Scalia, because it leaves matters to Congress, “which has
innumerable means (up to and including impeachment) of compelling the
President to enforce the laws it has written.”217 Thus, he would use the political
remedies doctrine to authorize a President to fail to enforce any statute, as long
as he can gin up a constitutional argument against it.218
Justice Scalia offered this attack on the rule of law to support a narrow
proposition—that the Court ought not to adjudicate friendly appeals by the
government of cases the government has won below by siding with the
plaintiff.219 But he goes much further, explaining that where a President does
213

See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 778–91 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 769 (majority opinion).
215
See id. at 756 (describing the argument that the Obama administration’s decision not to defend the
statute in the Supreme Court deprived the Court of jurisdiction because no party to the appeal could get redress
at that point).
216
See id. at 786–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217
See id. at 787.
218
Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court, 128 HARV. L. REV. 124, 145 (2014)
(noting that an executive branch decision not to defend a statute allegedly infringing on executive prerogative is
a form of “executive nonfeasance”) (emphasis added).
219
See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 781–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that since Windsor won in the District
Court and the government endorses the win, neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction).
214
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enforce a statute and then declines to defend its constitutionality, the court
should use the judicial power to cement the President’s decision to abrogate a
statute into law.220 He states that cases like this “should end in a[] [judicial] order
or consent decree enjoining enforcement.”221 So, a court lacking jurisdiction
because of a lack of adverse parties, according to Scalia, should still act to affirm
presidential power to nullify an act of Congress apparently without looking at
whether the President’s decision to cancel the law has an adequate constitutional
basis.222 Thus, the political remedies doctrine, in Scalia’s view, would allow a
President to abrogate statutes without any court taking a look at whether the
Constitution justifies the abrogation.
This view matters for a number of reasons: (1) Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas joined Scalia’s Windsor dissent and remain on the Court; (2) the
current conservative majority may find Justice Scalia’s ideas persuasive; (3)
lower courts have begun to follow the Windsor dissent’s logic to unravel
congressional power; and (4) the executive branch has treated it as an invitation
to defy the law. For example, the district court judge denying the House standing
to contest use of emergency powers to circumvent appropriation limits on wallbuilding relied on the Windsor dissent.223 And President Trump’s administration
accepted this invitation to nullify the law, by pursuing a policy of declining to
comply with subpoenas based on the idea that separation of powers principles
prohibited their enforcement.224
Yet, Scalia claimed that his approach would only render “some”
presidentially negated statutes beyond judicial review.225 He likely made this
concession to the power of the courts to check presidential decisions to abrogate
statutes because of the possibility that statutory beneficiaries might have
standing to sue to challenge presidential nullification of law. On the other hand,
Justice Scalia has noted that statutory beneficiaries face high burdens to
establishing standing.226 Furthermore, under Scalia’s approach in Windsor, a
220

Id. at 786.
Id.
222
Id. at 786–87.
223
See U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 16 (D.D.C. 2019), rev’d, 969 F.3d
353 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (citing Windsor to justify declining to adjudicate the House of Representative’s
claim that the President usurped the House’s appropriations power by building a wall unauthorized by statute).
224
Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2425 (2020) (noting President Trump argued that he is absolutely
immune from criminal process); Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2028 (2020) (noting President Trump argued
that congressional subpoenas “violated the separation of powers”).
225
See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 786 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that his arguments imply that
“some Presidential determinations that statutes are unconstitutional will not be subject to our review”).
226
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (citation omitted) (stating that it is
“substantially more difficult” for a statutory beneficiary than for a regulated party to establish standing); cf.
221
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statutory beneficiary would have to rush to the courthouse before a court entered
a consent decree ratifying presidential statutory nullification in order to make
sure that she had a chance.227 And if a court declares a statute unconstitutional,
it would greatly add to the collective action barriers that make sole reliance on
congressional efforts to “compel[] the President to enforce the laws”228
unrealistic in many cases.
The lower court cases and some older Supreme Court cases reveal that
Scalia’s approach to the political remedies doctrine coupled with an aggressive
President willing to assert broad separation of powers claims may severely mar
the rule of law. An early example comes from Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes.229 In this case, William Stokes sought payment for carrying the mail
pursuant to a statute giving the Solicitor of the Treasury the power to settle his
claim.230 The Postmaster General resisted enforcement of the statute by creating
a constitutional claim that the President, not the Solicitor, had the power to direct
the outcome.231 Since no political remedies doctrine existed, the Court resolved
the separation of powers claim the Postmaster General had created, holding that
Congress may constitutionally assign the adjustment of a claim to the Solicitor
of the Treasury.232 Under Scalia’s extension of the political remedies doctrine,
Wagner, supra note 15, at 526 (noting that congressmen often bring suits on issues that would otherwise prove
unreviewable).
227
The plaintiff might have a chance to challenge nonenforcement after an adverse ruling if the court
issued a narrow injunction and the decision had limited precedential value, but generally cannot know in advance
whether the injunction will be narrow or how high a case may go up the appellate ladder. Cf. Samuel L. Bray,
Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 420 (2017) (characterizing
nationwide injunctions as a recent invention and arguing for injunctions granting relief only to the plaintiff);
Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2018) (arguing that
nationwide injunctions are sometimes appropriate); Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2),
and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 620 (2017) (arguing for only enjoining
federal actions in “narrow circumstances”); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095,
2101 (2017) (arguing that the courts should only issue injunctions broad enough to provide “complete relief” to
the plaintiffs); Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 924 (2020)
(arguing that at least since 1913 the courts have issued universal injunctions); Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying
Nationwide Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV. 67, 72 (2019) (arguing that nationwide injunctions are “most necessary
and appropriate . . . when the government . . . refus[es] to abide by settled law”); Howard M. Wasserman,
“Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 335, 340 (2018) (arguing that nationwide injunctions are “inappropriate”); Zachary D. Clopton,
National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (2019) (discussing the role of preclusion in the
context of nationwide injunctions).
228
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229
37 U.S. 524 (1838).
230
See id. at 608–09 (discussing contracts for “transportation of the mail” and a law passed in 1836
directing the Solicitor of the Treasury to settle and adjust claims under that contract).
231
See id. at 612–13 (discussing the argument that the Solicitor is “subject to the direction and control of
the President”).
232
See id. (rejecting the argument “that the postmaster general was alone subject to the direction and
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the Postmaster General might have escaped judicial review of his failure to abide
by the statute by claiming that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on
presidential prerogatives.
Presidential attempts to convert ordinary cases into separation of powers test
cases have the capacity to cloak presidential lawbreaking with political remedies
doctrine protection. For example, well-settled law authorizes Congress and its
committees to issue and enforce subpoenas.233 The Trump administration,
however, resisted an effort to secure the testimony of White House counsel
Donald McGahn, arguing, contrary to applicable precedent, that presidential
advisors enjoy “absolute testimonial immunity.”234 By converting a routine
subpoena case into a separation of powers case, the DOJ brought this matter
within the scope of the political remedies doctrine. When the House of
Representatives sought to enforce statutory restrictions on the President’s use of
funds to build his wall, the District Court for the District of Columbia also
invoked the political remedies doctrine, even without a separation of powers
claim from the executive branch.235 Because the statutory issue arose in the
aftermath of a constitutional impasse, the District Court still treated this issue as
one of inappropriate intervention in a “power contest” between the President and
Congress.236
Thus, taken to its logical extreme, the political remedies doctrine has the
potential to seriously undermine the rule of law. For the rule of law requires that
the President faithfully execute the law, and the political remedies doctrine
might, if applied too vigorously and out of context, greatly limit law as a
constraining force on the executive branch of government.
III. THE POLITICAL REMEDIES DOCTRINE: A CRITIQUE
A major problem with the political remedies doctrine stems from its selective
application. The courts have not applied the doctrine to most cases involving
questions about the relative powers of the President and Congress, but only to
some of these cases.237 Nor have the courts explained why they apply it in some
control of the President”).
233
See Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (stating that Congress can
“act unilaterally to enforce a subpoena”).
234
Id. at 513.
235
See U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 12, 22 (D.D.C. 2019) (rejecting the
political remedies doctrine and noting that the House argues that 10 U.S.C. §§ 284, 2808 does not authorize the
wall construction).
236
See id. at 22 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 833 (1997)).
237
See United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining that the mere existence of
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contexts while ignoring it in most contexts, including all cases involving alleged
congressional encroachment on presidential power.
This Part argues that the politics preference justifies application of the
political remedies doctrine most strongly in cases where the political branches
have reached a bipartisan agreement through law. In other contexts, the case for
the political remedies doctrine is quite weak. It uses a property rights framework
to show that dismissal of a case challenging alleged unilateral usurpations of
power based on the political remedies doctrine establishes a baseline power
allocation, just as an explicit ruling on the merits would. Neither an implicit nor
an explicit power allocation precludes subsequent bargaining between the
political branches. For that reason, political remedies dismissals do not so much
avoid interfering with political bargaining as change the terms of bargains by
allocating power among the political branches.
It then explains that the politics preference is inconsistent with formalism in
separation of powers and with the notion that the Constitution’s power
allocations protect liberty, and thus with much relevant precedent. It also shows
that the doctrine relies on a dangerously naïve Madisonian vision of politics that
no longer describes congressional behavior. It continues by acknowledging that
the political remedies doctrine does help avoid the problem of unwise judicial
merits reasoning. It then argues that if the doctrine continues to exist, the lower
courts should not follow Justice Scalia’s suggestion to broaden its scope beyond
the contours of pure separation of powers disputes.
A. The Politics Preference and Political Agreement
The politics preference better justifies refusing to review bipartisan political
compromises enjoying the full support of Congress and at least one President
than it does refusing to review allegedly unconstitutional presidential action not
actively opposed by Congress as an institution.238 We saw in Part II that courts
sometimes struggle with determining whether a constitutional impasse allowing
merits adjudication under the political remedies doctrine has occurred. My
analysis suggested that a political impasse had occurred in Zivotofsky and in the
case on wall funding, but some judges in those cases thought the political

a conflict between Congress and the President “does not preclude” a judicial decision).
238
Like most legal concepts, the concept of bipartisan political compromise proves easy to apply in some
contexts and less easy in others. Congress does sometimes pass legislation with overwhelming majorities from
both parties, which surely implies a bipartisan compromise. On the other hand, legislation passed with few or
no votes from the minority party does not qualify. Some judgment may be necessary for in-between cases, but
generally legislation with substantial support from the minority party should qualify as bipartisan.
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remedies doctrine should apply anyway. Agreement between Congress and the
President in a statute, however, surely shows that no constitutional impasse
justifying judicial review under the political remedies doctrine exists.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court treated a question about the
National Bank’s constitutionality as “scarcely . . . open” in light of the political
branches’ agreement to create it.239 More recently, the Court has stated that
judges should “hesitate to upset the compromises and working arrangement that
the elected branches . . . have reached.”240 And the Court has frequently said that
statutes come before the Court with a heavy presumption of constitutionality.241
It would be but one step further for the Court to say that presidential and
congressional agreement about the distribution of powers among themselves
forecloses judicial review. To be sure, this step would require a justification. But
if it really is more normatively desirable to resolve separation of powers disputes
politically, as Powell claims, then surely the Court must refrain from disturbing
bipartisan political resolution of conflicts.242
In saying this, I do not mean to take a stand on the debate in the literature
between advocates of respecting political separation of powers bargains and
those more skeptical of them.243 Instead, this argument simply affirms that the
courts should be more reluctant to disturb bipartisan political agreements than
unilateral assertions of political power.244

239

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819).
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 526 (2014).
241
See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (explaining that a court should only invalidate a statute if its unconstitutionality is “so
clear that it is not open to rational question”).
242
Cf. William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36–41 (2019) (discussing
similarities between Madison’s understanding of legislative precedents liquidating the meaning of the
Constitution and the early Republic’s understanding of judicial precedent).
243
Compare JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 263 (1980) (advocating for remittance
of separation of powers questions involving the President and Congress to the “interplay of the national political
process”), and Huq, supra note 15 (advocating politically negotiated resolutions of separation of powers (and
federalism) claims), with Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 993 (suggesting that politically negotiated
resolutions of separation of powers cases produces “too much uncertainty” about power allocation).
244
Harlan Grant Cohen appears to disagree. He sees political agreement as a sign that healthy deliberation
has ended and suggests that courts should reopen it by striking down agreements. See Cohen, supra note 53, at
42. This argument turns debate into a fetish, as the end of a debate may suggest that a good solution has been
struck establishing stable law and Congress and the President can go on to debate something else. But the
relationship between this idea and my suggestion that the courts should be especially reluctant to undermine
statutes is not clear. See id. at 48 (suggesting political intervention when an individual right is at issue, not when
a statute settles separation of powers claims generally).
240

DRIESEN_10.11.21

2021]

10/11/2021 12:03 PM

THE POLITICAL REMEDIES DOCTRINE

39

B. Political Remedies Decisions and Baselines for Bargaining: Implications
of Treating Constitutional Power Allocations as Institutional Property
Furthermore, Justice Powell’s suggestion that judicial review of alleged
presidential usurpation of power cuts off opportunities for political resolution of
conflicts proves incorrect. A property rights framework helps us see that merits
rulings establish allocations of power, which serve as baselines for future
negotiations. The framework also reveals that dismissals under the political
remedies doctrine likewise establish allocations of power, which also provide
baselines for negotiations. Political remedies dismissals establish de facto
presidential rights rather than keep the judiciary from displacing political
decision-making.
The political remedies doctrine treats political power as a kind of
institutional property right.245 And it allows the property to shift hands through
adverse possession.246 The war powers cases invoking the doctrine perhaps best
illustrate the point that the doctrine basically treats constitutional power as a
property right subject to adverse possession. The doctrine suggests that the war
power, like a piece of property, can be transferred between parties by mutual
agreement. And the denial of judicial review when plaintiffs challenge the
President’s unilateral seizure of the property allows the President to seize war
power if Congress does not vigorously object, much as an occupier of land might
acquire a parcel by possessing it without objection from the original property
owner.
Judicial rulings on political remedies allocate the baseline property rights
that influence political bargains.247 To see this, it will help to analyze the
property rights problem in separation of powers a little more closely.

245
See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1518–19
(1991) (describing the Court’s “ultimate goal” in separation of powers cases as protecting each branch’s “‘turf’
. . . against encroachment by the others”); David A. Strauss, Article III Courts and the Constitutional Structure,
65 IND. L.J. 307, 309–10 (1990) (describing the property rights approach as a “troubling tendency in separation
of powers law”); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 115 (1994) (characterizing the Court’s approach as a “‘turf protection’ model”).
246
See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 570 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (accusing the majority
of relying upon an “adverse-possession theory” of separation of powers by expanding the recess appointments
power based on frequent presidential assertions of broad authority). That is not to say that the Supreme Court’s
employment of constitutional custom to resolve separation of powers claims on the merits necessarily recognizes
adverse possession. Cf. Huq, supra note 15, at 1625 (“[T]he theory of historical gloss . . . is not a constitutional
analogue to adverse possession.”). But if the politics preference leads to consistent dismissal of separation of
powers claims, as it has in the war powers area, then adverse possession does take place.
247
See, e.g., Koh, supra note 29, at 437 (stating that since the Goldwater decision, the President has
terminated almost all treaties which he decided to abrogate unilaterally).
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The Constitution allocates the relevant property rights partly in order to
create friction, not to eliminate transaction costs.248 Thus, the Constitution
divides the legislature into two houses and gives the President a veto power in
order to impede improvident legislation through the generation of transaction
costs.249 Conversely, the Framers opted to give the President the executive
power, rather than vest it in a council, as many states had, partly to lessen the
transaction costs of faithful law execution.250
Since the Constitution generates transaction costs, the preexisting allocation
of property rights strongly influences the bargains that the political branches
may strike. Students of law and economics often study the Coase theorem, which
teaches that, absent transaction costs, the initial property rights allocation does
not affect the efficient outcome.251 But conversely, the Coase theorem strongly
suggests that the initial allocation of property rights does affect the efficient
outcome when transaction costs are significant.252 Although the Framers evinced
no concern with efficient outcomes, they did distribute the relevant institutional
property rights to discourage some kinds of bargains.253
It follows that when a court rules on a political remedies doctrine claim, it
necessarily endorses a baseline property rights allocation for bargains. One
might say that it makes, in essence, a merits ruling on the allocation of power
between the executive and legislative branches.
The war power cases illustrate the point. A judicial decision to demand a
political remedy before adjudicating a challenge to unilateral presidential war
making gives the President the relevant property right. Congress, to be sure, can

248
See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2338 (describing raising transaction costs to preserve liberty
as the “cardinal virtue” associated with separation of powers).
249
See Seila Law L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020); Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1035 (noting that “legislators face severe problems of collective action in organizing
to oppose the executive”).
250
See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203 (linking the vesting of executive power in the President to securing
“energetic” law execution).
251
See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960); see also GEORGE J. STIGLER,
THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3rd ed. 1966) (coining the term “Coase theorem”).
252
See Dierdre McCloskey, Other Things Equal: The So-Called Coase Theorem, 24 E. ECON. J. 367, 368
(1998) (if transaction costs are high, “then it does matter where the liability” is placed); Huq, supra note 15, at
1603–04 (noting that the initial rights allocation affects outcomes); Adrian Vermeule, The Invisible Hand in
Legal and Political Theory, 96 VA. L. REV. 1417, 1428 (2010) (explaining why the Coase theorem does not
apply to bargains over the separation of powers).
253
See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2328 (treating inefficiency as a characteristic of having
competing institutions share lawmaking authority); cf. Huq, supra note 15, at 1603 (developing a property rights
framework for analyzing negotiation among branches of government but not claiming that the deals arrived at
are efficient).
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purchase the right. But the cost is high. To terminate a war once begun, Congress
may need to secure two-thirds of votes in both Houses and must accept the costs
of withdrawing troops already involved in combat (which might raise questions
about American reliability).254
Those challenging unilateral presidential war maintain that Congress must
declare war before the President may initiate it. That claim argues for a different
property rights baseline—one with Congress in possession of the property right.
If the courts recognize this property rights baseline and do not erect a
justiciability barrier, the President can still bargain with Congress. But he must
persuade a majority of Congress to affirmatively endorse his war plan before he
can send in the troops. This property rights allocation makes it hard for Congress
to evade responsibility and therefore raises the transaction costs associated with
deciding to go to war.255 A dismissal of a war power claim functions as a ruling
denying the merits of the congressional claim to possess the relevant property
right. It leaves the property right in the hands of the President, thereby making
it easier to go to war and lowering the transaction costs impeding war that
advocates of a congressional war power see as part of the original intent of the
Constitution.256
Similarly, the recent lower court rulings employing the political remedies
doctrine to deny enforcement of congressional subpoenas do not eschew judicial
decision-making in favor of political decision-making. They instead constitute
merits rulings changing the constitutional allocation of power in ways likely to
influence the results of bargaining. By dismissing enforcement demands, they
deny the argument that subpoenas are mandatory and give the President the right
to resist a subpoena. Congress remains free to try to persuade the President and
254
See Neumeister, supra note 85 at 2522 (mentioning the “high . . . political price of being accused of
abandoning troops in the field”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
255
Scholars do not agree upon the definition of transaction costs. David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The
Function of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Fiction, 47 ARIZ. L.
REV. 61, 84 (2005). The analysis here focuses on the bargaining costs of reaching a decision about whether to go
to war, an analogue to private costs incurred in reaching an agreement. See id. at 62 (developing the public
analogy to private transaction costs). The property rights assignment in the war powers case will also allocate
the political costs associated with decisions. If the President possesses the property right to decide whether to go
to war alone, he alone bears the political costs. If Congress has the property right, those costs are shared between
the President and the Congress. I do not characterize the political costs of going (or not going) to war as a
transaction cost. Rather, these costs appear similar to the reputational costs of producing a shoddy product (or
the reputational benefits of producing a good one), which are not usually considered transaction costs. One
might, however, argue that these political costs constitute transaction costs by pointing out that political actors
will consider ex ante estimates of the political costs of going to war in deciding whether to arrive at a bargain.
256
See, e.g., Neumeister, supra note 85, at 2521–22 (explaining that Congress could not cut off funds in
spite of the House’s opposition to President Obama’s war in Libya because doing so would require a two-thirds
majority to overcome a veto and is politically impossible once war has begun).
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to employ other remedies, but the costs of getting compliance become much
higher when the courts refuse to enforce subpoenas. Conversely, when the courts
enforce subpoenas, as they usually do, they do not preclude bargaining about the
scope of disclosure or use of presidential powers (e.g., the veto of other bills) to
kill them. The merits rulings in favor of Congress just raise the cost of
presidential resistance.
Ironically, when courts defer to the possibility of bargaining in making
decisions favoring the President, they may discourage bargaining in favor of
presidential defiance. Thus, by dismissing a suit against Don McGahn, the court
may have encouraged future presidents to do what President Trump did—forbid
any witnesses to testify in an impeachment proceeding.257 In Trump v. Mazars,
the Supreme Court based its decision to erect fresh restraints on congressional
subpoena power in a case seeking the President’s tax returns and other financial
information, in part, on its desire to encourage political bargaining.258 It feared
that a judicial willingness to enforce subpoenas would encourage Congress to
go to court instead of bargain.259 But its decision changed the terms of bargaining
and may have made political bargaining less likely by encouraging presidential
defiance of congressional subpoenas. Against a background norm requiring
compliance with reasonable requests for information, the executive branch and
Congress had generally resolved disputes about requests for information through
negotiation—until Donald Trump.260 Mazars changed the power allocation by
requiring fairly demanding judicial scrutiny of the congressional need for
information.261 It therefore potentially encouraged presidential defiance of
subpoenas.

257
Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 771 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (noting that President
Trump “direct[ed] widescale non-compliance with lawful” congressional inquiries).
258
Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2035 (2020) (explaining that unlimited judicial enforcement of
congressional power to obtain a President’s private information would “transform” the custom of negotiating
demands for information).
259
Id.
260
See id. (citing a two centuries old custom of resolving interbranch information disputes through
negotiation).
261
See id. at 2035–36 (outlining a test requiring a showing that the information requested is necessary for
legislation); David M. Driesen, Stealth Executive Privilege: Trump v. Mazars, JURIST (July 28, 2020, 07:30:38
PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/07/david-driesen-trump-mazars/ (showing that the Mazars test is
more demanding than the test governing information protected by executive privilege); Victoria Nourse, The
Dark Side of Mazars—Should a New York Prosecutor Have More Power to Check a President than the House
of Representatives?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y: EXPERT F. (July 13, 2020), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/thedark-side-of-mazars-should-a-new-york-prosecutor-have-more-power-to-check-the-president-than-the-houseof-representatives.
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Thus, the political remedies doctrine provides no escape from making merits
rulings on the allocation of power, merely allowing courts to avoid providing
reasoning for their merits rulings. And explicit merits rulings do not cut off
opportunities for political resolution of specific disputes, as they likewise just
establish the baselines for bargains.
In theory, the political remedies doctrine might permit periodic fluctuations
in baseline power allocations, which an explicit merits ruling might take off the
table.262 But in light of the low transaction costs facing the executive branch and
the high transaction costs facing the legislature, the doctrine, even if applied
even-handedly, would tend to support further aggrandizement of presidential
power.263
C. Formalism and Liberty: The Conflict with Precedent
The political remedies doctrine conflicts with precedent claiming that the
Supreme Court has the right to invalidate legislation agreed to by the President
and Congress. This precedent frequently relies on formalist line drawing rather
than acceptance of political agreements to determine constitutional outcomes,
sometimes citing the need to serve the liberty interests that separation of powers
protects.
This precedent suggests a weak judicial commitment to the politics
preference. Wide application of the doctrine would lead to adoption of Jesse
Choper’s proposal to make all separation of powers claims implicating the
relative powers of Congress and the President unreviewable, except in the rare
case of a constitutional impasse.264 The President failed to veto any of the
legislation that has led to modern Supreme Court decisions about statutes alleged
to violate separation of powers, so the political remedies doctrine, properly
applied, would have barred judicial review of an awful lot of cases.265 An even262
See, e.g., Koh, supra note 29, at 435 (arguing that the President does not have a formal power to
unilaterally terminate a treaty under Goldwater).
263
See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411, 440–47 (2012) (explaining in detail the impediments to collective action in Congress and
the incentives favoring presidential amassing of power); Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential
Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138, 144 (1999) (explaining why the President is much
better positioned than congressmen to advance institutional interests).
264
See CHOPER, supra note 243, at 263; Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 61 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court has never before “accepted a President’s . . . defiance of an Act of Congress in the field of
foreign affairs”).
265
See, e.g., Seila Law L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (CFPB), 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2238 (2020)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the President proposed the legislation creating the CFPB); Zivotofsky v.
Kerry, 576 U.S. at 7–8 (noting that President Bush signed the Act creating a right of American citizens living in
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handed political remedies doctrine would have rendered nonjusticiable not only
INS v. Chadha, but also cases reviewing the delegation of budget cutting
authority to the Comptroller General,266 for-cause removal protections for
various federal officials,267 a line item veto,268 establishment of a congressional
review board overseeing the Washington D.C. area airports,269 and the
congressional role in appointing members of the Federal Election
Commission.270 In all of these cases and many more, the Court, to put it mildly,
does not exhibit a commitment to the political resolution of separation of powers
disputes. Instead, it asserts judicial supremacy and claims a responsibility to “say
what the law is.”271
The political remedies doctrine, therefore, conflicts with a lot of precedent.
That does not mean that it is wrong. Perhaps the precedent is wrong.
The normative value of the political remedies doctrine, however, depends on
one’s conception of separation of powers more generally.272 The politics
preference basically adopts a functional theory of separation of powers,

Jerusalem to list Israel as the place of birth in their passports, but objected in a signing statement); Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 523 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the
President signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and issued a signing statement objecting to over 500 provisions but did
not raise separation of powers concerns); Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998) (explaining that the
Line Item Veto Act was the “product of much debate and deliberation in both Houses of Congress and . . . signed
into law by the President”); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 717 (1986) (stating that the President signed the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act into law); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968–74 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting) (noting that presidents have generally accepted legislative vetoes but sometimes objected
to specific ones, usually those that allow a committee of Congress to veto an administrative measure); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 261 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the President signed the campaign finance
legislation before the Court); Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth.
(MWAA), 917 F.2d 48, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1990), aff’d, 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (noting that the President signed the
MWAA of 1986 into law); cf. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth.
(MWAA), 501 U.S. 252, 278 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that state law created the review board
invalidated on separation of powers grounds in the case); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 969 n.5 (White, J., dissenting)
(noting that President Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution).
266
Cf. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 717–19 (not invoking the political remedies doctrine and reviewing delegation
of budget cutting authority to the Comproller General).
267
Cf. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2192 (striking down for-cause removal protection for the CFPB Director);
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (invalidating removal protections for members of the PCOAB).
268
Cf. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto Act violates
the Constitution’s Presentment Clause).
269
Cf. Citizens, 501 U.S. at 255 (evaluating whether a Board of Review consisting of nine congressmen
“violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers”).
270
Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 109–12 (describing the FEC’s structure and powers before finding its structure
unconstitutional).
271
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
272
Cf. Nash, supra note 14, at 368 (articulating a functionalist approach to congressional standing and
contrasting it with a “formalist . . . understanding of separation of powers”).
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eschewing formal line drawing in favor of political problem solving.273 As such,
the conception of power as property subject to sale through a negotiation is at
odds with a formalist view of separation of powers.274
The politics preference justifying the political remedies doctrine also
conflicts with the notion of separation of powers as a protector of liberty.275 The
liberty view calls into question a separation of powers philosophy that treats a
branch’s power as a kind of institutional property right to be lost by adverse
possession in the absence of institutional defense.276 The Supreme Court has
invoked the liberty idea to justify demarcating lines between the branches in
order to protect citizens, in spite of the existence of political remedies.277
273
See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939,
1950–71 (2011) (contrasting formalism and functionalism in separation-of-powers approaches); Peter L. Strauss,
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 491–92 (1987). The claim that the politics preference is “basically” functional does not
mean that all decisions refusing judicial review in favor of political remedies are functional. For example,
refusing to adjudicate challenges to the procedural mechanisms Congress employs on the ground that the
Constitution assigns decisions about impeachment procedures to the Congress is formalist rather than functional.
See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–36 (1993) (reading the Constitution’s granting of the “sole”
power to try impeachments to the Senate as precluding judicial review under the political question doctrine).
The political remedies doctrine refers to the idea that the possibility of political remedies generally justifies
dismissal of separation of powers claims, not to narrower claims grounded in a more particularized, and
sometimes formalist, reason to favor politics over adjudication.
274
See John C. Dehn, War is More than a Political Question: Reestablishing Original Constitutional
Norms, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 485, 512 (2019) (criticizing the idea that the political branches informally amend
the Constitution’s text governing separation of powers); see, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010) (declaring the President’s views about the separation of power irrelevant in a case
seeking enhancement of presidential authority). But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (suggesting that executive branch custom acquiesced in by
Congress may put a gloss on constitutional meaning and thereby augment presidential power).
275
See Dehn, supra note 274, at 512 (arguing that elected branch alteration of the Constitution is especially
“suspect” when it “alters the functional constitutional basis for invading fundamental individual rights”).
276
See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 571 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted)
(“Since the separation of powers exists for the protection of individual liberty, its vitality does not depend on
whether the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.”); cf. Baude, supra note 242, at 49–50
(explaining McCullogh suggests that otherwise binding legislative precedent about the scope of congressional
power might not apply where “the great principles of liberty” are at stake (citations and quotations marks
omitted)).
277
Seila Law L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 (2020) (“The Framers
recognized that . . . structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty.” (citation
and quotation marks omitted)); Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011) (stating that the separation of
powers and checks and balances aim to protect individuals); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996)
(stating that separation of powers protects liberty); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991) (characterizing protecting liberty as “the ultimate purpose of . . .
separation of powers”); see also Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 570 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding the
Constitution’s “government-structuring provisions . . . critical to preserving liberty”); Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding “[l]iberty . . . always at stake” in separation
of powers cases); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he Constitution diffuses power . . .
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To examine this liberty idea critically, it will help to make the liberty claim
concrete. The decision to go to war poses a great threat to the liberty and life of
soldiers.278 Jesse Choper pointed out decades ago, however, that the due process
claim available to a soldier in a war powers case does not constitute a classic
individual rights claim against the whole government.279 The federal
government can force a citizen to fight in a war through a draft and a war
declaration. The due process claim advanced by the Massachusetts soldiers in
Laird adds nothing of substance to a separation of powers claim. The
Massachusetts soldiers claimed that the process due was a declaration of war
and that the failure to provide that process violated their rights.280 The
government violated their rights if and only if their separation of powers claim
that Congress possesses the war power is correct.281
Yet, soldiers have a liberty interest in the proper separation of powers with
respect to the war power. If a President can start a war unilaterally, young people
will lose their freedom for their period of service and some will die. If the
President can only go to war after both Houses of Congress approve, many more
people keep their liberty and avoid death. Moreover, the Framers lodged the war
power in Congress in part because it saw resort to war as threatening to liberty
more broadly, potentially leading to loss of freedom among the general
population.282 Hence, separation of powers here does protect individual liberty,
not by completely guaranteeing it, but by making its infringement contingent on
a state interest in war so compelling that all of the political branches agree that
our young people must make the ultimate sacrifice. Of course, the government
can take away individual rights that we speak of as absolutely guaranteed when
a compelling state interest justifies their infringement.283 So, the claim that

to secure liberty . . . .”).
278
Cf. Dehn, supra note 274, at 516–17 (explaining why the war power “implicates fundamental liberty
interests”).
279
See CHOPER, supra note 243, at 329–30.
280
Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1971).
281
See id.
282
See THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ.
Press 1958); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
283
See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127–34 (1959) (rejecting a free speech claim from
a witness refusing to reveal his communist associations to a House committee because of the compelling state
interest in combatting communism); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79–81 (1959) (finding that the state’s
interest in self-preservation justified an attorney general’s demand for information aimed at identifying
communists and their supporters, which would otherwise violate freedom of association under the First
Amendment). See generally Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict
Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 355, 355 (2006) (noting the compelling state interest test’s centrality to
constitutional law and its use when government discriminates against a suspect class, burdens a fundamental
interest, or adopts a content-based regulation of speech).
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violation of separation of powers with respect to the war power infringes due
process resembles a classic individual rights claim in substance if not in form.284
Therefore, individual liberty considerations and original intent do not support
allowing political agreements to reallocate the war power.
The war powers example, however, does not establish that the proper
resolution of every separation of powers claim necessarily advances individual
rights, as the particulars of an arrangement of power often bear an uncertain
relationship to liberty.285 Consider Chadha again. Perhaps the Supreme Court
advanced individual liberty in that case by invalidating the House’s veto of an
executive branch decision to allow Chadha to remain in the United States. But
by establishing a rule against all one-house vetoes, it removed a check on other
liberty infringing actions (including going to war, as the War Powers Resolution
contains a legislative veto provision).286
The primary threat to liberty, though, comes not from a particular
rearrangement of powers, but rather from the collapse of checks and balances
leading to concentration of power in a single branch of government. Given the
President’s power and ability to enhance his own power with limited transaction
costs, the primary risk currently stems from presidential aggrandizement of
power over time, as Justice Jackson recognized in his Youngstown concurrence
and as recent destruction of democracies in other countries confirms.287 From
that perspective, the political remedies doctrine, as currently used, creates more
of a risk to democracy than many unwise merits rulings.

284
A compelling state interest can abrogate both the soldier’s claim and any other individual rights claim.
The soldier’s claim differs from other individual rights claims only in how the compelling state interest is
identified. In a classic individual rights case, the court makes a policy judgment based on judges’ views of what
state interests are compelling. In the war powers case, the political process determines whether a compelling
state interest exists.
285
See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 47, at 862 (explaining why “[o]ne can rarely know whether relocating
power to a different branch . . . of government would obviate or exacerbate” claimed injuries); Aziz Z. Huq,
Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1484–85, 1488 (2013) (finding no strong
relationship between separation of powers and liberty based on comparative law and the uncertain proclivities
of actors empowered by separation of powers decisions); Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1006, 1036 (2014) (finding the line item veto “orthogonal to libertarian goals”).
286
See Huq, supra note 15, at 1682 (the legislative veto, sequester, and line-item veto struck down by the
Court may have augmented rather than diminished liberty).
287
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653–54 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(explaining that implied emergency powers provide a step toward dictatorship and that, in light of the President’s
enhanced power, more danger comes from authorizing its enhancement than from limiting it); DAVID M.
DRIESEN, THE SPECTER OF DICTATORSHIP AND JUDICIAL ENABLING OF AUTOCRACY 50–51, 95–120 (2021)
(forthcoming); TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 212 (2018)
(characterizing a “strong executive” as the “principal” risk to democracy).
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The political remedies doctrine’s functional property rights conception of
separation of powers is at odds with the liberty protection justification and
formalism often employed in deciding cases.288 In practice, the Supreme Court
vacillates between formalist and functional views of separation of powers,
frequently using a formalist approach to cabin congressional power, whilst using
functional approaches to enlarge presidential power.289 Similarly, the Court
sometimes justifies separation of powers rulings by reference to liberty
protection, but usually does not.290 But dismissing cases because of the politics
preference underlying the political remedies doctrine conflicts with the many
precedents asserting judicial supremacy even over agreed upon bargains.
D. Political Remedies and National Politics
The political remedies doctrine not only fails to avoid the merits and
conflicts with precedent rejecting the politics preference; it also depends upon
an outmoded Madisonian conception of politics.291 Madison envisioned the
political branches zealously guarding their institutional prerogatives and thereby
keeping each other in check.292 If one assumes that Congress remains a
principled institution zealously and consistently guarding its political
prerogatives, then the mere existence of political remedies may make judicial
review of presidential action appear unnecessary, at least to a functionalist
seeing no threat to liberty in the likely political solutions.
But commentators generally recognize that federal legislators these days
often have much more loyalty to their political party than to Congress as an
institution.293 The Framers of our Constitution sought to avoid the creation of
288
Cf. Meyer, supra note 42, at 108 (accusing Justice Scalia and Judge Bork of “inexplicably relax[ing]”
boundary formalism when it comes to recognizing executive power).
289
See Barry L. Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1089, 1099–26 (2000) (discussing the inconsistency); Strauss, supra note 273, at 489; see also David M.
Driesen & William Banks, Implied Presidential and Congressional Powers, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1301, 1324–
25 (2020) (discussing how the Court favors presidential over congressional implied power).
290
See Grove, supra note 14, at 625 (noting that liberty interests “rarely factor into the Court’s analysis
in” separation of powers cases).
291
See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2313 (characterizing the Madisonian vision of politics as
“clearly anachronistic”).
292
See id. at 2312–13.
293
See, e.g., Kenneth Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. 665, 670, 687
(2016) (policy and partisan concerns drive the political branches rather than defense of “structural prerogatives”);
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 263, at 414–15 (“Congress . . . does not systematically . . . protect its
prerogatives . . . .”); Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2313 (loyalty to political parties has displaced loyalty
to one’s branch of government); cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 997 (assuming that legislators
sometimes are “motivated to promote the interests of institutions to which they belong, although in other cases
they are not”).
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faction and thought that their design of the legislature would provide a check on
faction and demagoguery.294 Political parties, however, have arisen and, in many
ways, abandoned the Madisonian vision.295 Hence, the political assumptions
underlying the political remedies doctrine, while perhaps plausible at the time
of Goldwater, now seem out of date.296
During periods of divided government, one might expect Congress and the
President to still clash on ideological grounds.297 These clashes might result in
adequate checks and balances.298
The Founders (meaning the Constitution’s Framers and ratifiers) endorsed
separation of powers to avoid having so much power in one branch of
government that it posed a threat to democracy and the rule of law. Given the
current strength of the presidency and weakness in Congress, the risk of a
President achieving too much power seems most serious.299 And the analysis
above suggests that the lack of transaction cost impediments to executive power
can aid presidential power grabs. This suggests that the President’s opportunities
to amass a dangerous amount of power will likely arise when he enjoys sufficient
ideological support in Congress to avoid political checks.300
The history of democracy loss abroad confirms that the separation of powers
problems that truly threaten the Republic likely will not arise from a President
defying an active and engaged legislative assembly defending its institutional
prerogatives, the scenario which informs Choper’s views and the political
remedies doctrine. Heads of state usually convert democracies to autocracies
when a political party supporting the head of state backs him with lock-step
votes in order to dismantle at least some checks and balances, while declining to
take action to stop the autocrat’s own measures decimating the remainder.301
294

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 38 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 10, at 43 (James Madison).
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2320–22 (explaining how political parties first arose and disrupted
the Madisonian vision).
296
Cf. CHOPER, supra note 243, at 275 (assuming that Congress and the President will “jealously” guard
their “prerogatives against invasion”).
297
See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2327 (noting that when control of the government is divided
between parties “we should expect . . . interbranch political competition resembling the Madisonian dynamic of
rivalrous branches”).
298
See Landau, supra note 20, at 1111–12 (stating that where different parties control the legislature and
the presidency, “the self-enforcing story of separation of powers may approximate reality”).
299
See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2343 (noting that the “great[est] fears of unchecked exercises
of power center on the imperial presidency”).
300
See id. at 2338–39 (explaining that unified governments pose the “greatest threat to . . . liberty”).
301
See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 287, at 97–98 (discussing dismantling of interbranch checks as
eroding democracy); Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2018)
(discussing how an “autocratic legalist[]” defeats checks and balances and changes parliamentary procedure to
295
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Antifederalists feared a “cabal” between the President and the Senate.302 Given
the vast scope of delegated presidential authority, a President may do in our
constitutional democracy with a Senate majority sufficient to put in appointees
more loyal to an autocratic President than to the law and to thwart any attempted
impeachment aimed at executive branch abuses.303
Furthermore, political science teaches us that autocrats come to power when
partisan polarization makes legislative assemblies incapable of addressing
societal problems adequately.304 During such periods, Congress may prove
especially incapable of adopting the political remedies needed to safeguard its
powers.305 The political remedies doctrine, at least insofar as it relies on the
formal availability of remedies rather than the likelihood of their use, disables
judicial review when preservation of the Republic most needs judicial
involvement.
Because a partisan Congress may support a President by passing legislation
systematically demolishing constitutional constraints, the courts should review
partisan legislation aggrandizing presidential power.306 That is why my proposal
only suggests applying the political remedies doctrine to bipartisan
legislation.307
From this perspective, the current asymmetric application of the political
remedies doctrine seems not just unprincipled, but potentially dangerous. It
allows the courts to strike down statutes checking presidential power, while
permitting dismissal of cases of presidential usurpation.
deny the opposition party rights to speak about or amend bills).
302
See, e.g., 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 508 (Merill
Jenson, et al. eds., 1976).
303
See DRIESEN, supra note 287, at 135–36 (explaining how control of the Senate can enable a President
to persecute opponents, thwart impeachment, and prevent enactment of legislative restraints checking a drive to
autocracy).
304
See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 22, at 113–17.
305
This does not mean that the legislature is incapable of addressing societal problems during every period
when one party does not control the House, Senate, and presidency. Cf. DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE
GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–1990, at 4 (2d ed. 1991) (pointing out that
divided government did not greatly slow the pace of investigations or legislation in the period studied). But
extreme polarization can cause a breakdown of the legislative process or passage of legislation on party line
votes, rather than through compromises. See SARAH BINDER, POLARIZED WE GOVERN? 14–15 (May 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/BrookingsCEPM_Polarized_figReplacedTextRev
TableRev.pdf (suggesting that gridlock may have increased as party polarization deepened).
306
Cf. Huq, supra note 15, at 1604 (suggesting that courts should review bargains where Congress sells
its own institutional interests short because of collective action problems).
307
Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2354–55 (suggesting more skepticism toward the executive
power when the president’s party controls Congress than when it does not, but acknowledging that this proposal
might challenge judicial “capacity and inclination”).
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Of course, when a President with support from his party starts dismantling
checks and balances, judges may doubt their capacity to reign in a despotic
President. But the courts in Colombia and South Africa did play a role in
preserving their countries’ threatened democracies through rulings questioning
executive powers.308 And the United States Supreme Court helped support
popular forces struggling against autocracy in the southern United States with
its voting rights rulings.309 While political forces matter much more than the
judiciary in stemming democracy loss, courts have a role to play.310 Courts can
aid political forces fighting an autocracy by using their institutional authority to
condemn breaches of constitutional norms, thereby creating a credible signal of
illegitimacy cutting through the noise of partisan claims and counterclaims about
legality.311
E. The Problem of Unwise Judicial Reasoning on the Merits
The best reason to support a strong symmetric political remedies doctrine
involves the difficulties in appropriate judicial resolution of separation of
powers claims.312 Courts struggle to reconcile conflicts between separation of
powers and checks and balances in a context of frequently overlapping powers
only vaguely specified in the Constitution.313 While originalists claim to have a

308
See Landau, supra note 20, at 1107–08 (explaining how Colombia’s constitutional Court may have
saved Colombian democracy by issuing a ruling prohibiting President Uribe from running for a third term).
309
See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 287, at 37–39; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 238–48 (2004); LEVITSKY &
ZIBLATT, supra note 22, at 89–90.
310
See DRIESEN, supra note 287, at 144–50 (analyzing the judiciary’s ability to help prevent autocracy);
Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq, Democracy’s “Near Misses,” 29 J. DEMOCRACY 16 (2018) (discussing cases where
court rulings have played a role in preserving democracy).
311
See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1022 (claiming that “[g]overnment violation of a clear
allocation of power can trigger general resistance because the stipulated allocation serves as a focal point for
resistance”). But see Landau, supra note 20, at 1072 (suggesting that structural constitutional rulings require
political or popular support to be successful).
312
See Ryan, supra note 10, at 6 n.10 (finding that “interpretive uncertainty” in the separation of powers
context undercuts claims of judicial “interpretive supremacy”); Huq, supra note 15, at 1676 (doubting the
Supreme Court’s capacity to sensibly resolve interbranch disputes, partly because of pro-presidential bias); Vicki
Jackson, Congressional Standing to Sue: The Role of the Courts and Congress in U.S. Constitutional
Democracy, 93 IND. LJ. 845, 890 (2018) (stating that “[t]he risks of courts getting structural issues wrong is
high”).
313
See Huq, supra note 15, at 1606 (mentioning “inclusive constitutional texts” and “open-ended historical
evidence” respecting separation of powers); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation
of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 604 (2001) (trying to achieve balance among three branches of
government fails because we cannot distinguish among the relevant powers in contested cases nor identify an
appropriate balance); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1127, 1194 (2000) (stating that “[w]e do not know what ‘balance’ means, and we do not know how it is achieved
or maintained”).
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method for giving fixed meanings to some of these questions, recent scholarship
suggests that originalism provides a constellation of approaches providing
varying answers depending on both methodological choices and the weighing of
usually conflicting evidence regarding original intent.314
It would require another article to thoroughly analyze whether the courts’
rulings in this area have much merit as constitutional law. It is possible that
leaving questions like this to the judiciary just substitutes unelected political
actors for elected ones without producing credible authority.315
The political remedies doctrine’s principal virtue involves avoidance of
unwise judicial merits reasoning. That virtue might well justify declining to
review bipartisan legislation signed by a President, at least when the agreed upon
allocation does not systematically impair liberty interests. But, arguably, the
doctrine’s problems outweigh its virtues in other contexts, as it does not avoid
unwise decisions, just bad rationales. Furthermore, the political question
doctrine provides a better and less blunt tool for separating questions likely to
trigger poor judicial decisions from less problematic questions.
Thus, the Supreme Court may have been wise to avoid adopting the political
remedies doctrine as currently used. As currently applied, it conflicts with its
precedent, has a questionable normative foundation, relies on very problematic
political assumptions, and may end up supporting political efforts to dismantle
separation of powers.
F. Narrowing the Doctrine
If the courts do not abandon the doctrine or confine it to cases involving
separation of powers challenges to bipartisan political compromises agreed to
by both branches of government, they should at least avoid applying it so broadly

314
See George C. Christie, The Well-Intentioned Purpose but Weak Epistemological Foundation of
Originalism, 51 CONN. L. REV. 451, 459 (2019) (characterizing the Constitution’s original meaning as “often . . .
highly contested”); Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459, 462 (2016) (“new originalists”
challenge the notion that original meaning provides determinate answers to constitutional questions); Lawrence
B. Solum, Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations and Constitutional Originalism, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49,
54–56 (2020) (discussing forms of originalism).
315
See Seila Law L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2225–26 (2020) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “the judiciary possesses an inferior understanding of . . . the way political power
operates” compared to that of Congress and the President (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Brown, supra
note 245, at 1517 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence as an “incoherent
muddle”); cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Honoring Dan Meltzer-Congressional Standing and the Institutional Framework
of Article III: A Comparative Perspective, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1783, 1801 (2016) (noting that U.S. Supreme
Court justices lack “serious experience in political processes”).
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that it severely undermines the rule of law. The political remedies doctrine
should not apply to efforts to force the executive branch to comply with or
enforce statutes. That limitation is consistent with Justice Powell’s articulation
of the doctrine, as limited to interbranch disputes over separation of powers.316
The question of whether a statute is enforced properly should not depend
upon whether the current Congress cares enough to enforce it. The courts and
the executive have duties to implement a law passed by Congress, even if the
current Congress does not have majorities in both houses to support it anymore.
The constitutional remedy for changing the law to respond to political needs is
amendment or repeal of a statute with presentment to the President, not failure
by the executive and the courts to properly enforce the law. Congress has vast
responsibilities and should not have to discuss and pass fresh legislation before
laws it has already passed get implemented.317 Requiring political remedies in
this context severely undermines the rule of law by substituting demands for
political transactions for the responsibility to operate under a stable legal
framework established in the past.
The property rights framework developed to analyze constitutional
separation of powers dismissals also implies that permitting legislators, or at
least a House of Congress, to secure proper enforcement of statutes in court does
not risk “undermining” deliberation in Congress if more discussion of an
existing statute is desirable.318 Whether a suit is dismissed or not, Congress
remains free to discuss whether to amend the statute in light of developing
implementation problems.
Much less should a Court approve a consent decree with the government to
abrogate a statute without carefully examining the validity of the constitutional
claim said to justify presidential nullification. Justice Scalia’s application of the
political remedies doctrine would invoke the capacity of Congress to enforce the
law to justify dismissal of legal challenges to the President’s nullification of a
statute while simultaneously making the law unenforceable through a consent
decree, thereby probably making a congressional remedy impossible. Scalia’s
approach would invite an ideologically motivated or power-hungry president to
assert bogus constitutional claims to generate consent decrees abrogating

316
See generally Dalton v. Spencer, 511 U.S. 462, 471–74 (1994) (distinguishing between violation of
separation of powers and violation of a statute).
317
Cf. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 17, at 1314–15 (arguing that barring congressional suits to secure
proper law enforcement advances “the deliberative function of interbranch conflict”).
318
Cf. id.; Cohen, supra note 53, at 41 (assuming that “delineating the exact boundaries between
congressional and presidential power” cuts off political debate).
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statutes he does not like. Furthermore, as Professor Sant’Ambrogio points out,
legislative remedies may prove unavailing or extremely costly if the President
refuses to implement a statute on constitutional grounds.319
IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
The analysis so far has focused on the political remedies doctrine, not the
other justiciability doctrines surrounding it. Even the abandonment of the
political remedies doctrine, however, leaves open the possibility of dismissing
separation of powers cases on other grounds.320
While the political remedies doctrine squarely raises the question of when
the Court should eschew adjudication in favor of political resolution of
controversies, the idea permeates the other justiciability doctrines as well.321
Indeed, the cases applying the political remedies doctrine do so under the rubrics
of ripeness, standing, the political question doctrine, or equitable discretion. The
Court now identifies its justiciability doctrines with separation of powers and a
little more specifically with the properly limited role of the judiciary in a
democratic society.322
The property rights analysis suggests that the courts should recognize that
they do not avoid interfering with political processes when they eschew judicial
review of separation of powers cases.323 If a justiciability dismissal precludes
later judicial review of a separation of powers question, as in a political question
doctrine ruling or a standing ruling leaving no other parties with likely standing,
it also functions like a merits ruling.324
As a positive matter, the analysis above suggests that if the courts want to
avoid “improper interference” in the political branches’ decision-making, they
319
See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 17, at 1317–19. See generally Grove, supra note 14, at 647 n.183
(scholars have found the impeachment and appropriation remedies especially costly).
320
See, e.g., Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 17, at 1276–78 (discussing the question of whether Congress or
its members suffer an injury justifying standing when the executive allegedly fails to properly enforce a statute);
Wagner, supra note 15, at 541–50 (discussing whether various types of injuries alleged by congressmen justify
standing after having argued against the political remedies doctrine to dispose of congressional lawsuits).
321
See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988) (describing
avoiding judicial usurpation of the political branches’ policy-making function as the standing doctrine’s
purpose).
322
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
323
See Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 441, 442 (2004) (stating that application of the political question doctrine requires political decisions).
324
Cf. Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1395, 1396 (1999) (the courts have used the political question doctrine “under the guise of judicial modesty
to alter the scope of federal foreign relations law”).
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should usually apply justiciability limits more strictly to cases seeking to upset
existing political compromises embedded in statutes and less strictly to cases
adjudicating alleged presidential usurpation of power.325 The fact that Congress
faces higher transaction costs than the President likewise supports lower
justiciability barriers to challenges to presidential usurpation. The analysis also
suggests that the courts should not take the existence of a democratic society for
granted in deciding what proper limits circumscribe the judicial function.
Judicial review can play a role in preserving a democratic society. Scholars
should use this Article’s analysis of the political remedies doctrine to more
precisely figure out how justiciability doctrines should change.
The notion that justiciability doctrines allow the courts to avoid “becoming
embroiled in . . . partisan” controversies seems suspect.326 The courts have
embroiled themselves in partisan controversies by finding complaints about
political gerrymandering nonjusticiable and dismissing subpoena enforcement
actions under the political remedies doctrine.327 The courts can foster
bipartisanship by limiting their opportunities to strike down key bipartisan
achievements, like the Voting Rights Act and campaign finance legislation.328
Limiting justiciability in interbranch disputes does little to protect the court’s
reputation.329 A case’s potential to embroil a court in partisan conflict depends

325
Cf. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Ind. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 803 n.12 (2015) (claiming that
the Court has applied its standing doctrine with special rigor when asked to decide “whether an action by one of
the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional” (citations and quotations marks
omitted)); Barnett, supra note 293, at 670 (causation and redressability to contest structural arrangements should
be “inapplicable or significantly relaxed” as they are for “run-of-the mill . . . procedural challenges”); Nash,
supra note 14, at 355 (finding “clear justification” for especially rigorous standing doctrine in “cases raising
interbranch disputes”). But see Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
501 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1991) (liberally interpreting standing requirements by finding a citizen group’s noise
related injuries fairly traceable to a Review Board’s structure because the Review Board’s unexercised veto
power “undoubtedly influenced” the body drawing up the plan); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 n.5 (1986)
(not even considering the ripeness of a challenge to an unexercised removal provision, even though its
constitutionality depended on predictions about how it would work in practice).
326
See Devins, supra note 22, at 79 (arguing that “congressional lawsuits . . . embroil the courts in highly
partisan . . . fights,” which harm the courts); Grove, supra note 14, at 658 (mentioning this goal in an argument
against congressional standing in separation of powers cases).
327
See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (5-4) (holding that “partisan
gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts”); Comm. on the
Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (2-1), rev’d sub nom. United States House of
Representatives v. Mnuchin, 969 F.3d 353, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (denying enforcement of a subpoena
favored by Democrats based on the political remedies doctrine and standing, even though courts have generally
ruled on the merits of subpoena cases brought by a congressional body with subpoena power).
328
Cf. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (5-4 on partisan lines) (striking down the
Voting Rights Act’s preclearance provisions); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66
(2010) (5-4) (overruling precedent in order to strike down restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures).
329
See Wagner, supra note 15, at 536 (noting that the press and the public “may well equate judicial
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much more on the issues presented than on the identity of the litigants or whether
the courts resolve the case on the merits or through a justiciability ruling.
Furthermore, while the judges’ anxiety to protect the courts’ reputation is
understandable, it may be dangerous if it neglects wider separation of powers
problems in the political branches.330

CONCLUSION
The political remedies doctrine has played a role in significant judicial
decisions, especially in the lower courts. While articulated as a neutral rule
protecting both political branches, its current applications always support
expanding already great presidential power at the expense of a decrepit
Congress.331 Furthermore, it has great potential to unravel the rule of law.
The doctrine, if it survives, should apply only to avoid adjudication of
statutes alleged to violate separation of powers, as these often reflect bipartisan
political compromises of the sort that the doctrine’s rationale supports. Political
remedies doctrine dismissals, however, resolve the merits of separation of
powers cases without merits reasoning. Judicial opinions admitting to resolution
of the merits do not end political bargaining; they simply change the property
rights baseline and therefore the likely resolutions. The Supreme Court was
probably wise to avoid adopting the doctrine for this reason and because it
conflicts with its precedent. Furthermore, the political remedies doctrine reflects
an outmoded view of politics that makes application of its precepts potentially
dangerous, as it takes the courts off the stage when the political process breaks
down in a way that threatens the collapse of separation of powers.

abstention with informal approval”).
330
See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1042 (noting that a myopic focus on the judiciary’s welfare
ignores the “overall . . . costs and benefits” of exercising the “passive virtues”).
331
See Grove, supra note 14, at 623 (linking complaints of congressional gridlock to concerns about
presidential power filling the void).

